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Summary 
This report is designed to provide Congress with a perspective on the contemporary political 
system of China, the only Communist Party-led state in the G-20 grouping of major economies. 
China’s Communist Party dominates state and society in China, is committed to maintaining a 
permanent monopoly on power, and is intolerant of those who question its right to rule. 
Nonetheless, analysts consider China’s political system to be neither monolithic nor rigidly 
hierarchical. Jockeying among leaders and institutions representing different sets of interests is 
common at every level of the system.  
The report opens with a brief overview of China’s leading political institutions. They include the 
Communist Party and its military, the People’s Liberation Army; the State, led by the State 
Council, to which the Party delegates day-to-day administration of the country; and the National 
People’s Congress (NPC), China’s unicameral legislature. On paper, the NPC has broad powers. 
In practice, the legislature is controlled by the Communist Party and is able to exercise little of its 
constitutionally mandated oversight over the state and the judiciary. Following its 18th Congress 
in November 2012, the Communist Party ushered in a new Party leadership. New State and NPC 
leaders took office following the opening session of the 12th NPC in March 2013. 
Following the overview, this report introduces a number of distinct features of China’s formal 
political culture and discusses some of their implications for U.S.-China relations. Those features 
include the fact that China is led not by one leader, but by a committee of seven; that the military 
is not a national army, but rather an armed wing of the Communist Party; that provincial leaders 
are powerful players in the system; and that ideology continues to matter in China, with the 
Communist Party facing vocal criticism from its left flank each time it moves even further away 
from its Marxist roots. Other themes include the role of meritocracy as a form of legitimization 
for one-party rule, and ways in which meritocracy is being undermined; the introduction of an 
element of predictability into elite Chinese politics through the enforcement of term and age 
limits for holders of public office; the Chinese system’s penchant for long-term planning; and the 
system’s heavy emphasis on maintaining political stability. The next section of the report 
discusses governance challenges in the Chinese political system, from “stove-piping” and 
bureaucratic competition, to the distorting influence of bureaucratic rank, to factionalism, 
corruption, and weak rule of law.  
The second half of the report is devoted to detailed discussion of China’s formal political 
structures—the Party, the military, the State, the National People’s Congress, a consultative body 
known as the China People’s Political Consultative Conference, and China’s eight minor political 
parties, all of which are loyal to the Communist Party. Also discussed are other political actors 
who play a role in influencing policy debates, including the media, big business, research 
institutes, university academics, associations, and grassroots non-governmental organizations. 
The report concludes with a discussion of prospects for political reform, noting that while China’s 
new Communist Party chief has called for everyone to be bound by the constitution and law, 
Party policy is to reject vigorously the notion of a multi-party system, separation of powers, a 
bicameral legislature, or a federal system, on the grounds that all are unsuited to China’s 
conditions. 
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Introduction  
This report is designed to provide Congress with a perspective on the contemporary political 
system of China, the world’s second-largest economic power, one of five permanent members of 
the United Nations Security Council, and the only Communist Party-led state in the G-20 
grouping of major economies.1 By introducing some of the distinct features and governance 
challenges of China’s political culture, the report aims to help Congress understand the ways in 
which political actors in China interact, or in some cases, fail to interact, with implications for 
China’s relationship with its neighbors and the world. By introducing some of the leading 
political institutions and political actors in China, the report aims to help Congress understand 
where Chinese interlocutors sit within the Chinese political system, gauge their relative influence, 
and judge the authoritativeness of their statements with respect to official policy. Where 
appropriate, the report also seeks to highlight ways in which China’s political culture affects 
official Chinese interactions with the U.S. government. 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP or Party) has been in power in China for 63 years, a 
record of longevity that rivals and could in six years surpass that of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union.2 The CCP assumed power in 1949 by means of a civil war victory over the forces 
of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists, who moved the seat of their Republic of China government to 
the island of Taiwan. The Communists named their new regime the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). Although the CCP has been continually in power since, China’s political institutions and 
political culture have evolved significantly over those decades, with the CCP’s willingness to 
adapt helping to explain why it has, so far at least, avoided the fate of its sister parties in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  
Today, although the Party is committed to maintaining a permanent monopoly on power and is 
intolerant of those who question its right to rule, analysts consider the political system to be 
neither monolithic nor rigidly hierarchical. Jockeying among leaders and institutions representing 
different sets of interests is common at every level of the system. Sometimes fierce competition 
exists among the members of the Communist Party’s seven-man Politburo Standing Committee 
and 25-member Politburo, China’s highest decision-making bodies. It also exists among 
ministries; between ministries and provincial governments, which are equals in bureaucratic rank; 
among provinces; and among the headquarters departments and service branches of the military. 
The military and the Foreign Ministry are often on different pages. Deputies to the National 
People’s Congress, China’s weak legislature, sometimes attempt to push back against the 
government, the courts, and the public prosecutor’s office. As part of a trend of very modest 
political pluralization, moreover, other political actors are increasingly able to influence policy 
debates. Such actors, who may join forces to advance particular causes, include an increasingly 
                                                 
1 The world’s other remaining Communist Party-led states are Cuba, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam, none of which is 
a member of the G-20. The G-20 countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. 
2 The Soviet Union was established in 1922 and collapsed in 1991. Its ruling Communist Party, in power for 69 years, 
was initially called the Russian Communist Party. It changed its name in 1925 to the All-Union Communist Party 
(Bolsheviks), and in 1952 to Communist Party of the Soviet Union. China’s ruling party has kept the same name 
throughout its history. It is sometimes referred to as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and sometimes as the 
Communist Party of China (CPC). Official Chinese documents most often use the latter formulation. This report uses 
the former.  
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diverse media, micro-bloggers, state-owned and private corporations, official and quasi-official 
research institutes, university academics, officially sponsored associations and societies, and 
grassroots non-governmental organizations. 
One test of a political system is its ability to manage political transitions. In the run-up to a once-
in a decade change in the Communist Party’s leadership in November 2012, Communist Party 
Politburo member and Chongqing Municipality Party Secretary Bo Xilai fell from grace, 
exposing at least one serious rift in the leadership, raising questions about the unity and probity of 
China’s remaining leaders, and, because of Bo’s ties to senior military figures, raising questions 
about the loyalty of parts of the military to the central Party authorities. (See text box on p. 19.) In 
the same period, the leadership was also shaken by revelations in the foreign media about the vast 
personal fortunes amassed by relatives of the outgoing premier, Wen Jiabao, and the incoming 
Party General Secretary, Xi Jinping.3 Despite the turmoil in its top ranks, the Party convened its 
18th National Congress in November 2012 without public displays of discord, and immediately 
afterwards appointed a new leadership. Xi Jinping was named both General Secretary of the 
Communist Party and Chairman of the body that oversees the military, the Party’s Central 
Military Commission. He added the title of State President at the first session of the 12th National 
People’s Congress in March 2013. The NPC meeting also produced a new Premier of the State 
Council, Li Keqiang, and other new top state officials. 
Many analysts, both in China and abroad, have questioned the long-term viability of China’s 
current political system, in which the Party remains above the law, leadership politics is a black 
box, and civil society and the right to free speech and association are severely constrained. While 
he was in office, China’s recently retired Premier, Wen Jiabao, called for political reform, 
including reform of “the leadership system of the party and the state,” warning that, “Without the 
success of political structural reform, it is impossible for us to fully institute economic structural 
reform. The gains we have made in reform and development may be lost, new problems that have 
cropped up in China’s society cannot be fundamentally resolved and such historical tragedy as the 
Cultural Revolution may happen again.”4 Wen never elaborated, though, on precisely what sort of 
political reform he hoped to see.  
China’s new Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping raised hopes for a change in the 
Communist Party’s relationship to the law when he called in December 2012 for full 
implementation of China’s state constitution and declared that, “No organization or individual has 
the special right to overstep the Constitution and law, and any violation of the Constitution and 
the law must be investigated.”5 Xi has also repeatedly mentioned the need for the Party to police 
itself, rather than allowing any outside body to do so, however. Perhaps tellingly, in a January 
2013 speech, he urged Party organizations and members to abide not by the state constitution, but 
rather by the Party’s constitution, a separate document.6 The apparent contradictions among Xi’s 
statements make his attitude toward political reform unclear. 
                                                 
3 David Barboza, “Billions in Hidden Riches for Family of Chinese Leader,” The New York Times, October 25, 2012; 
Michael Forsythe, Shai Oster, Natasha Khan, and Dune Lawrence, “Xi Jinping Millionaire Relations Reveal Fortunes 
of Elite,” Bloomberg, June 29, 2012. 
4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Premier Wen Jiabao Meets the Press,” transcript, 
March 15, 2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t914983.htm. 
5 “CPC’s new chief pledges to implement rule of law,” Xinhua News Agency, December 4, 2012; Zhao Yinan, “Uphold 
Constitution, Xi says,” China Daily, December 5, 2012. 
6 “Xi Jinping vows ‘power within cage of regulations’,” Xinhua News Agency, January 22, 2013. According to Xinhua, 
(continued...) 
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Overview of China’s Political Institutions  
Figure 1. China’s Leading Political Institutions 
The Communist Party dominates the Chinese political system 
 
Source: CRS research. 
True to its Leninist roots, the Chinese Communist Party dominates state and society in China. Its 
power rests on four pillars: its control of China’s approximately 2.25 million person-strong 
military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), its 1.5 million person-strong paramilitary force, 
the People’s Armed Police, and its 800,000 other internal security forces;7 its control of 
personnel appointments across all political institutions, the military, state-owned corporations, 
and public institutions; its control of the media; and its control of the judiciary and the internal 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
“Xi stressed all Party organs and members should strictly enforce Party discipline, abide by its Constitution, and 
implement the Party’s theories, line, principles and policies.” 
7  Figures for force size from Richard D. Fisher, Jr., China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global 
Reach (Stanford University Press, 2010), p. 5. The 2006 edition of China’s Defense White Paper stated that the PLA 
had 2.3 million troops and the PAP had a force size of 600,000. Information Office of the State Council, People’s 
Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2006, White Paper, December 29, 2006, http://www.china.org.cn/
english/features/book/194421.htm. 
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security apparatus. (For discussion of the Party organs in charge of these functions, see “The 
Party Bureaucracy.”) The Party’s leadership role is referenced five times in the preamble to the 
PRC’s 1982 constitution, but is not mentioned in any of the articles of the constitution, creating 
ambiguity about the legal basis for the Party’s vast powers.8  
The Party entrusts implementation of its policies and day-to-day administration of the country to 
the institution of the State, headed by the State Council and including the State’s ministries and 
commissions and layers of “people’s governments” below the national level. The top State 
officials at every level of administration usually concurrently hold senior Party posts, to ensure 
Party control.  
According to China’s state constitution, the National People’s Congress (NPC) oversees the 
State Council, as well as four other institutions: the Presidency, the Supreme People’s Court, the 
public prosecutors’ office, and the military. In practice, the NPC, like People’s Congresses at 
every level of administration, is controlled by the Communist Party and is able to exercise little 
oversight over any of the institutions officially under its supervision. NPC deputies are expected 
to approve all budgets, agency reports, and personnel appointments put before them. The NPC’s 
most significant power is its ability to initiate and shape legislation.  
The formal political system also includes two other categories of institutions, although they have 
little substantive power. The first is People’s Political Consultative Conferences (PPCCs), the 
most senior level of which is known as the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC) National Committee. The Party and State ostensibly “consult” with PPCCs on policy 
issues.9 The second set of institutions is China’s eight minor political parties, known as the 
“democratic parties.” All the parties were established before the Communists came to power, 
pledge loyalty to the Communist Party, and accept its leadership. The existence of the PPCCs and 
the minor parties allows the Communist Party to describe China’s political system as one of 
“multi-party cooperation and political consultation led by the Communist Party of China.”10 
Features of China’s Formal Political Culture  
The formal Chinese political system has a number of distinct features. Awareness of these 
features can be helpful for congressional interactions with Chinese officials and institutions, and 
can inform Congress’s understanding of official Chinese behavior.  
                                                 
8 The full English-language text of the 1982 state constitution and its subsequent amendments can be accessed on the 
website of the People’s Daily, the mouthpiece of the Communist Party Central Committee, at 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html. The clearest statement in the constitution mandating 
continued Communist Party rule reads: “Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the 
people’s democratic dictatorship and follow the socialist road.... ” Chinese critics of one Party rule sometimes make 
their case obliquely by calling for revision of the Preamble to the Constitution. 
9 The People’s Congresses extend down to the township level, one level above the village, and the People’s Political 
Consultative Conferences extend down to the county level, one level above the township. 
10 See discussion of this concept on an authorized Chinese government portal site operated by the CCP’s external 
propaganda arm, the State Council Information Office: http://www.china.org.cn/english/Political/29034.htm. 
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Collective Leadership 
China has had no supreme leader since the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1997. The seven men who 
sit on the country’s most senior decision-making body, the Communist Party’s Politburo Standing 
Committee (PSC),11 form a collective leadership in which each man has a rank, from one to 
seven, and shoulders primary responsibility for a specific portfolio. (See Table 1 for the names 
and offices of all seven members.) Party General Secretary Xi Jinping is ranked first among the 
seven and has responsibility for convening PSC and larger Politburo meetings. He also controls 
some of the most consequential portfolios, including military and foreign affairs. Unlike his 
predecessor, who had to wait two years after becoming head of Party to be named head of the 
military, Xi was awarded the top military post immediately upon taking over leadership of the 
Party, a development that has enhanced his authority. Like all his colleagues, however, Xi must 
still win consensus from the rest of the group for major decisions. Forging agreement can be 
difficult, in part because members of the PSC owe their jobs to horse trading among different 
constituencies, interest groups, and influential retired Party elders, whose interests they represent 
informally on the PSC.12 
Table 1. The 18th Central Committee’s Politburo Standing Committee  
All Were Appointed at the First Plenum of the 18th Central Committee in November 2012 
Name (family 
name is listed 
first) Party position(s) Birthdatea Other titles Portfolio 
Xi Jinping General Secretary of the 
Communist Party; Chairman 
of the Party Central Military 
Commission 
June 1953 State President; 
Chairman of the 
State Military 
Commission 
The Communist 
Party and foreign 
and military affairs 
Li Keqiang No. 2 Ranked Politburo 
Standing Committee (PSC) 
Member 
July 1955 Premier and Party 
Secretary of the 
State Council 
Government 
administration and 
the economy 
Zhang Dejiang No. 3 Ranked PSC Member November 
1946 
Chairman, Standing 
Committee of the 
12th National 
People’s Congress  
Legislative affairs 
Yu Zhengsheng No. 4 Ranked PSC Member.  April 1945 Chairman, 12th 
National Committee 
of the Chinese 
People’s Political 
Consultative 
Conference  
Relations with non-
communists 
Liu Yunshan No. 5 Ranked PSC Member; 
Member of the Party 
Secretariat; President of the 
Central Party School 
July 1945  Party affairs 
                                                 
11 The Politburo Standing Committee is also known as the Political Bureau Standing Committee. 
12 For more information about the dynamics of the PSC, see Alice L. Miller, “The Politburo Standing Committee under 
Hu Jintao,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 35 (September 21, 2011), http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-
leadership-monitor/article/93646. The authors are grateful to Prof. Joseph Fewsmith of Boston University for insights 
into this topic. 
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Name (family 
name is listed 
first) Party position(s) Birthdatea Other titles Portfolio 
Wang Qishan No. 6 Ranked Member of 
the PSC; Secretary of the 
Central Disciplinary 
Inspection Commission 
July 1948  Party discipline and 
fighting corruption 
Zhang Gaoli No. 7 Ranked Member of 
the PSC 
November 
1946 
No. 1 Ranked Vice 
Premier  
Assisting the 
Premier; the 
economy 
Source: Website of the Communist Party’s mouthpiece, The People’s Daily, http://cpc.people.com.cn/. 
a. Because of age limits for senior offices, all those born before 1950 are expected to retire at the next Party 
Congress, in 2017. Only Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang are expected to continue serving. 
The collective leadership feature of the Chinese political system is designed to guard against a 
repeat of the excesses of the era of the PRC’s founding father, Mao Zedong, when a single out-
sized leader was able to convulse the nation with a series of mass political campaigns. It is also 
meant to guard against the emergence in China of a figure like Mikhail Gorbachev, whose 
decisions are widely blamed in China for the collapse of the Soviet Union. Before his death in 
1997, China’s supreme leader, Deng Xiaoping, served as the ultimate check on the power of the 
Party general secretary, cashiering two reformist General Secretaries, Hu Yaobang in 1987 and 
Zhao Ziyang in 1989, before settling on Jiang Zemin in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen 
massacre. It is unclear whether Jiang, age 86, or other retired leaders would today have the 
authority to remove the general secretary if he were to pursue policies with which they 
profoundly disagreed.  
The Military as an Armed Wing of the Communist Party 
China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is not a national army belonging to the 
state. Rather, it is an armed wing of the Communist Party, with the Party’s exercise of “absolute 
leadership” over the military a fundamental guarantee of Communist Party rule. The PLA’s 
willingness to put the Communist Party’s interests first was tested in 1989, when the Party 
ordered tanks into the streets of Beijing to clear unarmed protestors from Tiananmen Square. The 
PLA did as the Party ordered, killing hundreds of protestors in the process—no authoritative 
death toll has ever been released. The PLA also served the Party by enforcing seven months of 
martial law in the capital before and after the killings, even though its actions badly damaged the 
PLA’s image within China and around the world.  
A heavy emphasis on political indoctrination—and particularly on the need for the PLA to be 
unswervingly loyal to the Communist Party—has been a hallmark of the PLA from its earliest 
days. Among the five “core values” for the military outlined by China’s most recent Party and 
military chief, Hu Jintao, “loyalty to the Party” came first, ahead of “ardent love for the people,” 
and “service to the country.”13 In remarks to troops in December 2012, China’s new top Party and 
                                                 
13 James Mulvenon, “Hu Jintao and the ‘Core Values of Military Personnel,’” China Leadership Monitor, no. 28 (May 
8, 2009). 
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military leader, Xi Jinping, described obeying the Party’s command as “the soul of the military” 
and the military’s ability to engage in combat and win battles as a “top priority.”14 
A major tool for Party control of the military is the General Political Department (GPD), one of 
the four “general departments” of the PLA headquarters, all of which are represented on the 
Party’s Central Military Commission. Among other things, the GPD is responsible for political 
training and military personnel matters, including management of personnel dossiers, promotions, 
and job assignments. GPD political commissars (known at lower levels as political directors and 
political instructors) serve side-by-side with military commanders at all levels of the PLA, and 
head the Party committees in all PLA units. Almost all PLA officers are Party members.15 Only 
two uniformed officers serve on the Party’s Politburo, however, and none serve on China’s most 
senior leadership body, the Politburo Standing Committee. 
Scholars and others in China have sometimes broached the possibility of strengthening the PLA’s 
institutional ties to the State by “de-politicizing” it, or “nationalizing” it. The Party has repeatedly 
rejected such notions. In 2012, at a press conference marking the 85th anniversary of the founding 
of the PLA, a military spokesman denounced talk of de-politicization as “erroneous ideas” raised 
with “ulterior motives.”16 Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping reportedly confirmed 
his opposition to de-politicization in leaked remarks in December 2012 in which he blamed the 
collapse of the Soviet Union on Moscow’s decision to depoliticize the Soviet military.17 
The Legislature: Strong on Paper, Weak in Practice 
China’s 1982 state constitution, adopted six years after the death of Mao Zedong, describes the 
country’s unicameral legislature, the National People’s Congress, as “the highest organ of state 
power.” The constitution gives the NPC the power to amend the constitution; supervise its 
enforcement; enact and amend laws; ratify and abrogate treaties; approve the state budget and 
plans for national economic and social development; elect and impeach top officials of the state 
and judiciary; and supervise the work of the State Council, the State Central Military 
Commission, the Supreme People’s Court, and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. In reality, 
however, the NPC exercises many of those powers in name only.  
One major reason for the NPC’s weakness is the Communist Party’s insistence that it serve as 
little more than a rubber stamp for Party decisions. While the constitution gives the NPC the right 
to “elect” such top state officials as the President, Vice President, and Chairman of the State 
Central Military Commission, for example, in practice, the Party decides who will fill those 
positions. The NPC’s role is simply to ratify the Party’s decisions.  
Some analysts see a related reason for the NPC’s weakness in the dual identity of most of its 
deputies and the way they are “elected.” The Party nominates all candidates for positions as 
deputies, usually nominating 20% to 50% more candidates than available positions. Provincial-
                                                 
14  “Xi Orders PLA to Intensify Combat Awareness,” Xinhua News Agency, December 12, 2012, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-12/12/c_132036566.htm. 
15 Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), pp. 33-34. 
16 “China Stresses Party’s Absolute Leadership over Army: Military Officer,” Xinhua News Agency, July 29, 2012. 
17  “Leaked Speech Shows Xi Jinping’s Opposition to Reform,” China Digital Times, January 27, 2013, 
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2013/01/leaked-speech-shows-xi-jinpings-opposition-to-reform/. 
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level People’s Congresses and the People’s Liberation Army elect deputies from among the 
nominees. Campaigning is forbidden.18 Because China rejects the principle of the separation of 
powers, the heads of all the constitutional branches of government over which the NPC is meant 
to exercise oversight are themselves NPC deputies, including the President and the Premier of the 
State Council. In all, according to calculations by a leading Chinese media organization, 85% of 
the current NPC’s nearly 3,000 deputies hold concurrent posts as Communist Party or state 
officials or civil servants.19 Holders of state, judicial, and procuratorial positions are barred, 
however, from serving on the NPC Standing Committee, the elite body that carries out the work 
of the NPC when the full NPC is out of session, as it is for all but approximately 10 days a year. 
As a guarantee of Party control of the legislature, a member of the Party’s seven-man Politburo 
Standing Committee serves concurrently as chairman of the NPC Standing Committee. 
Proposals for political reform in China often involve empowering the NPC to play the role 
envisioned for it in the constitution. Proposals have focused, for example, on incentivizing the 
NPC to enforce the state constitution by creating a dedicated committee under the NPC Standing 
Committee to review laws passed nationwide for compliance with the constitution.20 Others have 
suggested that the Party rule through the NPC, using only the NPC’s powers as outlined in the 
constitution. If the Party were to do so, however, it would be significantly curbing its powers and, 
for the first time, submitting them to constitutional restraints. 21 
The Power of Provincial Governments 
Provincial leaders are powerful players in the Chinese political system. Six of them, all Party 
Secretaries, sit on the Party’s Politburo, making them among the 25 most powerful officials in the 
country. All provincial leaders share at least the same bureaucratic rank as central government 
ministers. With the 2011 inauguration of a U.S.-China Governors Forum, designed to bring 
together U.S. governors and Chinese provincial Party secretaries and governors, outreach to 
provincial leaders has become an important element of U.S. policy toward China.  
                                                 
18 Jiang Jinsong, The National People’s Congress of China (Foreign Languages Press Beijing, 2003), pp. 86-104. Jiang 
notes on pp. 96-97 that, “The Election Act entitles national organizations and the provincial organizations of every 
political party and of every people’s organization to nominate candidates of Deputies to the NPC. In addition, 10 or 
more Deputies of the incumbent NPC in each of the electoral units are also entitled to jointly nominate candidates to 
the NPC.” That said, however, he writes that, “In reality all candidates to the NPC are nominated by the Communist 
Party in consultation with the other parties and the people’s organizations at the national and provincial levels.” 
19 “南南南论： 化化化 化优 优 通通通化通畅 ,” (Improve the Composition of Deputies: Clear the Way for Expression of 
Popular Opinion), South Metropolitan News editorial, March 10, 2012. 
20 李勇 (Li Yong), “建立有效可行的宪法实施监督机制,” (“Establish an Effective, Feasible Mechanism to Review 
Implementation of the Constitution”), 学习时报 (Study Times), January 21, 2013, http://www.studytimes.com.cn:9999/
epaper/xxsb/html/2013/01/21/05/05_27.htm. 
21 The Vice President of China’s Supreme People’s Court, Jiang Bixin, is closely associated with this proposal. Jiang 
argues that the NPC’s relatively robust constitutionally mandated powers would be “sufficient for the Party to exercise 
effective control over administrative and judicial powers, and leadership over state power.” Jiang’s stated rationale for 
proposing such an arrangement: that it would ease the tension between the Communist Party’s current approach to 
ruling and the constitution’s depiction of the NPC and local people’s congresses as China’s fundamental system of 
government. 江江江 (Jiang Bixin), “关关南关关 关关关关关 关关 关关 关关义 义 义义 论 ” (“Theoretical Thinking on Certain 
Questions Related to Building a Socialist Country Ruled by Law”), 关 理论论  (Theoretical Horizon), June 2012, p. 13. 
See also Jiang Bixin, “全全全 全关全关关关关关关进 : 以以 以关以以以 以 以以习 习 习 ,” (“Some Thoughts on Comprehensively 
Promoting the Rule of Law: Background to Studying the Party’s 18th Congress Report”), 人通 人论论论  (People’s Forum 
Magazine), Issue 385, November 23, 2012. 
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Figure 2. Map of China 
Showing Provincial-Level Administrative Divisions 
 
Source: Esri Basemaps 2006. Map created by Hannah Fischer, CRS Information Research Specialist. 
Levels of Administration22 
China has four levels of formal administration under the central government. The first level is officially made up of 34 
provincial-level governments. This includes 23 provinces; five geographic entities that China calls “autonomous 
regions,” which have large ethnic minority populations (Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang); four 
municipalities that report directly to the central government (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin); and the two 
special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau. The PRC’s count of 23 provinces includes Taiwan, the island 
of 23 million people that the PRC does not control, but over which it claims sovereignty.  
The second level of administration includes more than 300 prefectural-level administrative units, including prefectures 
and prefectural-level cities. The third level of administration includes nearly 3,000 counties and county-level cities. 
The lowest tier of official administration is made up of approximately 40,000 townships and towns.  
The first, third, and fourth levels of administration all have political structures that mirror the central government, 
with parallel Party and government organizations and people’s congresses. At the second administrative level, 
prefectural-level cities and autonomous prefectures also have government organizations and people’s congresses, but 
regular prefectures do not. Instead, they have administrative agencies. 
                                                 
22 For a detailed discussion of China’s administrative divisions, see Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of China, 3rd 
ed. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 179-81. 
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Villages are not considered part of the formal administrative structure, but are rather considered “mass organizations 
of self-management at the grass-roots level.” Their status outside the government hierarchy allowed China to 
introduce direct elections at the village level in the 1980s without setting a precedent for direct elections at higher 
levels. 
Fiscal decentralization has been a major force empowering provincial governments. Provinces 
have their own revenue streams, and governments at the provincial level and below are 
responsible for the lion’s share of the country’s public expenditure, including almost all public 
spending on education, health, unemployment insurance, social security, and welfare.23 Provinces 
also have the right to pass their own laws and regulations, which may extend national laws and 
regulations, but not conflict with them. Beijing gives provinces considerable leeway in adopting 
policies to boost economic growth and encourages provinces to undertake approved policy 
experiments.  
Beijing sometimes seems to struggle to impose its will on the provinces. Central government 
ministries have bureaus in the provinces, but they report both to their ministry in Beijing and to 
the provincial leadership. When priorities are in conflict, the leaders of such bureaus tend to put 
the provincial leadership’s interests first, not least because the provincial leadership controls 
personnel assignments. China operates a unitary political system, not a federal system, however, 
and ultimately, Beijing has the upper hand. Provinces do not have their own constitutions and do 
not have the power to appoint their own leaders. The Party’s Organization Department in Beijing 
manages the appointments and promotions of all provincial Party Secretaries and governors, and 
routinely moves those provincial leaders from province to province, and in and out of posts in 
Beijing, to ensure that they do not build up regional powerbases. For the same reason, the Party 
also ensures that military region boundaries do not overlap with provincial boundaries. Beijing’s 
leverage over the provinces includes its ability to send the Party’s Central Disciplinary Inspection 
Commission into provinces to investigate corruption allegations, and to send the General 
Auditor’s Office into provinces to check their books.24  
Document-Based Culture 
In the Chinese system, the statements of individual leaders are almost always less authoritative 
than documents approved by the collective leadership, with the most authoritative documents 
being those approved by the Communist Party Central Committee. A corollary is that the 
officially sanctioned published form of a leader’s words is almost always more authoritative than 
the words as originally delivered, with the act of publication providing an important stamp of 
party approval. Notably, former Premier Wen Jiabao used interviews with the foreign media to 
discuss his ideas for political reform, but the Chinese state media never reported the substance of 
those interviews, limiting their authority and impact in China.25 
China’s document-based culture also includes a heavy reliance on paper documents, even in a 
digital age, with the circulation of paper documents, and the accumulation of signatures on them, 
                                                 
23 Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of China, 3rd ed. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 200. 
24 Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of China, 3rd ed. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 186-187. 
25 For discussion of Wen’s calls for political reform, see Alice Miller, “Splits in the Politburo Leadership?,” and Joseph 
Fewsmith, “Political Reform Was Never on the Agenda,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 34 (February 22, 2011), 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/article/67996. 
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helping to build consensus. In the U.S.-China relationship, the great store China places in 
documents helps explain why the Chinese side has pushed so hard for the issuance of a series of 
detailed joint statements between the two countries. The Chinese side considers these to be highly 
authoritative texts containing guiding principles for the relationship, although U.S. officials 
generally do not accord them similar importance, a disconnect that creates a potentially dangerous 
expectation gap. 
The Importance of Ideology 
Ideology matters more in China than in many other political systems. As the Chinese Communist 
Party has sought to adapt itself to a changing world, it has had to wrestle with ways to revise its 
ruling ideology to allow the change necessary for its survival, without changing its ideology so 
much as to undermine further its already tenuous justifications for maintaining a permanent 
monopoly on power. The CCP waged a successful revolution and established the People’s 
Republic of China with the promise that it would help farmers and workers overthrow their 
“exploiters,” the landlords and capitalists, and establish socialism and ultimately communism, in 
which all property would be publicly owned, and all classes would cease to exist.26 In its 
constitution, the Party still officially proclaims the “realization of communism” to be its “highest 
ideal and ultimate goal.”  
As a ruling party, rather than a revolutionary party, however, the CCP now defines itself as 
representing “the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people,”27 
including capitalists. In 2007, long after privately owned businesses began driving double digit 
economic growth rates in its coastal provinces, and long after its real estate markets began to 
boom, China finally passed a law protecting private property rights. Each time the Party edges 
further away from its Marxist roots, even if only to catch up with reality on the ground, it faces 
howls of protest from China’s marginalized but still vocal Marxists. China’s preferential 
treatment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), a point of friction in U.S.-China relations, is caught 
up in this ideological debate. The Preamble to CCP’s constitution today still holds that, “The 
Party must uphold and improve the basic economic system, with public ownership playing a 
dominant role.”28 
The Ideal and Reality of Meritocracy 
An important element of the Communist Party’s bid for ideologically based legitimacy is the 
notion that people rise within the Party or State hierarchy based on what the Party constitution 
describes as “their moral integrity and their professional competence,” and “on their merits 
without regard to their origins.”29 The Party, which manages personnel appointments across the 
Chinese political system, the military, and all public institutions, argues that this arrangement 
helps make China’s political system superior to the political systems of countries that elect their 
leaders in competitive, multi-party elections. The degree to which China really does operate a 
                                                 
26 For discussion of the role of ideology in Chinese politics, see William A. Joseph, “Ideology and Chinese Politics,” in 
Politics in China: An Introduction, ed. William A. Joseph (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 129-164. 
27 Full Text of Constitution of Communist Party of China (as amended on November 14, 2012), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/25/content_6944738.htm. 
28 Ibid. The Preamble is also sometimes known as the “General Program.” 
29 Ibid, Article 33. 
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meritocracy is a subject of debate, however. A detailed 2012 study conducted by scholars in the 
United States and China found no evidence of a correlation between rank in the Communist Party 
hierarchy and success in delivering “exceptional economic growth”—a strong indicator of 
professional competence. The authors did, however, find that the Party awarded promotions based 
on factional ties, familial ties to senior leaders, and educational qualifications.30 The children of 
high-level officials, dubbed “princelings” (taizi) in colloquial Chinese, are particularly prominent 
at the highest levels of the Chinese political system, with four of the seven members of the 
current Politburo Standing Committee meeting that description. China’s most prominent 
princeling is Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, the son of revered early 
revolutionary Xi Zhongxun. 31 Meanwhile, corruption and sex scandals have undermined the 
Party’s claim to appoint leaders with “moral integrity.” China has also seen a rise in the practice 
of the buying and selling of public office, in which officials illegally auction off posts.  
Age and Term Limits for Official Positions 
Although a relatively recent innovation, introduced beginning in 1997, enforcement of age and 
term limits for top Party and State positions has brought a degree of predictability into otherwise 
opaque Chinese elite politics. At the last three quinquennial Party Congresses, in 2002, 2007, and 
2012, no one older than 67 was appointed or reappointed to the Politburo Standing Committee or 
the broader Politburo. In 2012, the Party extended that age limit to all members of the Central 
Military Commission. Unless they serve concurrently on higher bodies, ministers, provincial 
Party Secretaries, and governors cannot be older than 62 when appointed to new terms, and have 
a retirement age of 65, although those in the middle of their terms are often permitted to stay on a 
little longer.32 Meanwhile, all top officials are limited to two five-year terms in the same posts. 
Those age and term limits define the number of positions that will turn over at each Party 
Congress and limit the pool of possible candidates. Age limits mean that five of the seven 
members of the current Politburo Standing Committee are expected to serve only one five-year 
term; only Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang are young enough to serve a second term. By virtue of their 
age, the two youngest members of the newly appointed 25-member Politburo have emerged as 
possible future national leaders in waiting. They are Hu Chunhua, the Party Secretary of 
Guangdong Province, and Sun Zhengcai, the Party Secretary of provincial-level Chongqing 
Municipality, both aged 49. 
Penchant for Long-Term Planning 
As a legacy of the centrally planned economic system of the 1950s and 1960s, the Chinese 
political system places a heavy emphasis on long-term planning. At five-year intervals, the 
                                                 
30 Victor Shih, Christopher Adolph, Mingxing Liu, “Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the 
Advancement of Central Committee Members in China,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 106, No. 1 
(February 2012), pp. 166-187. 
31 Other princelings in the Politburo Standing Committee are Zhang Dejiang, son of former PLA Major General Zhang 
Zhiyi; Yu Zhengsheng, son of Huang Jing (Yu Qiwei), the first husband of Madame Mao Zedong and an early Party 
Secretary of the city of Tianjin; andWang Qishan, son-in-law of former Politburo Standing Committee member and 
Vice Premier Yao Yilin. Cheng Li, China’s Top Future Leaders to Watch, Brookings Institution, 2012, 
http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/china/top-future-leaders. 
32 For information about these age restrictions and how top Party officials are selected, see Alice Miller, “The Road to 
the 18th Party Congress,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 36 (January 6, 2012), http://www.hoover.org/publications/
china-leadership-monitor/article/104231. 
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Communist Party General Secretary presents a report to the Party Congress outlining the Party’s 
priorities for the country. It is one of the most authoritative documents in the Chinese political 
system. China also prepares “Five-Year Plans” that set economic, demographic, and social targets 
and identify priority industries for development. Other official plans lay out roadmaps for 
development in various fields over longer time-frames. A roadmap for scientific development, for 
example, covers the period through 2050.33 Such plans are not followed to the letter, but they 
have a powerful role in guiding official policy. 
The Communist Party has also tried to apply a long-term planning approach to grooming future 
political leaders. The most prominent example of an official groomed for high office over a 
lengthy period is former Party General Secretary Hu Jintao, who was appointed to China’s top 
decision-making body as heir apparent to then General Secretary Jiang Zemin in 1992, a full 
decade before he finally ascended to the top job, which he held for another decade. China’s 
current top two Party leaders, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, had shorter, five-year-long 
apprenticeships.  
Emphasis on Political Stability 
In 1989, China’s Communist Party faced the challenge of large-scale protests in Beijing’s 
Tiananmen Square and in more than 100 other cities around the country. Disagreements about 
how to respond split the top Party leadership and forced out the Party General Secretary at the 
time, Zhao Ziyang. As noted earlier, the decision by Deng Xiaoping, then China’s supreme leader, 
to order in the army to clear the Beijing protesters by force undermined the Party’s legitimacy and 
severely damaged China’s standing in the world. Since then, the Party has made maintenance of 
social stability one of its top priorities, deploying a vast internal security apparatus to head off 
protests or, once they erupt, to prevent them from spreading.  
The domestic security apparatus includes an 800,000-strong police force under the Ministry of 
Public Security and a 1.5 million-strong paramilitary force, the People’s Armed Police, which 
reports to both the Party’s Central Military Commission and, through the Ministry of Public 
Security, to the State Council. The 2.25 million-strong People’s Liberation Army also has a 
domestic stability mandate, on top of its national defense mandate. Other agencies involved in 
internal security include the Party’s Propaganda Department, which plays an important role in 
censoring the media to prevent discussion of subjects that might feed movements for change; the 
Ministry of State Security, which focuses on internal security threats as well as conducting 
intelligence-gathering abroad; and the Ministry of Justice, which operates China’s prison 
system.34 All but the Propaganda Department are overseen by the Party’s Central Commission of 
Politics and Law and all are powerful bureaucratic players in the Chinese political system, 
although as of November 2012, the head of the Commission now sits at the Politburo level, 
alongside the head of the Propaganda Department, rather than at the level of the more senior 
Politburo Standing Committee. Since 2010, China’s spending on such internal security agencies 
as the police, the People’s Armed Police, the courts, and the prison system has outstripped its 
                                                 
33 The science plan, issued by the Chinese Academy of Sciences in 2009, is entitled, “Innovation 2050: The Science 
and Technology Revolution and China’s Future” ( 江创 科科科科关科关关科科2050: ). 
34 For an overview of the internal security apparatus, see Richard D. Fisher, Jr., China’s Military Modernization: 
Building for Regional and Global Reach (Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 32-34. 
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spending on the military. The 2013 national budget contained planned spending of $123.7 billion 
on internal security (not including the PLA), compared to $119 billion on defense.35 
Governance Challenges in the Chinese Political 
System 
Since 1978, the CCP has worked to build, almost entirely from scratch, a set of governing 
institutions and a system of laws capable of handling rapid economic and social development at 
home and ever more complex interactions with the global community. The Communist Party’s 
insistence on the principle of unchallenged Communist Party rule atop this system has been one 
of the few constants in the process. China has carried out seven sweeping re-organizations of 
government in the last 30 years, establishing new agencies and coordinating committees, spinning 
off of the old “line” ministries, merging other ministries, and adjusting the bureaucratic status 
and/or jurisdiction of many government bodies. Keeping track of the changes adds to the 
challenge of understanding China’s policy process. These institutional reforms have not, however, 
managed to solve some enduring challenges in the Chinese system undermining effective 
governance. 
“Stove-Piping” and Bureaucratic Competition  
Among the Chinese political system’s governance difficulties is the phenomenon known as 
“stove-piping,” in which individual ministries and other hierarchies share information up and 
down the chain of command, but not horizontally with each other. China has no coordinating 
body analogous to the U.S. National Security Council. “Leading Small Groups” at the top of the 
Party and the State seek to bring together representatives from multiple agencies to coordinate 
and build consensus around policy in specific areas, but they have small staffs, vary widely in 
their level of activity, and are usually unwilling to get involved in forcing day-to-day coordination 
among their member agencies. In the U.S.-China relationship, one of the values U.S. officials see 
in the Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED) mechanism is that it forces multiple Chinese 
agencies to come together under one roof to talk with the U.S. government about issues in the 
relationship, and, as a side benefit, to talk to each other.  
A related governance issue is unproductive competition among official entities. It is not 
uncommon in China for multiple entities to attempt to assert jurisdiction over the same issue, 
competing with each other for scarce budget resources, power, and recognition from higher 
government officials. A government restructuring carried out in March 2013 attempted to address 
some of the most glaring cases of overlapping jurisdiction, disbanding the country’s National 
Population and Family Planning Commission and merging its family planning divisions into the 
Ministry of Health, for example, and combining multiple competing maritime law enforcement 
agencies under a single organization, the State Oceanic Administration. In the latter case, 
however, bureaucratic competition may still be a problem because while the State Oceanic 
Administration reports to the Ministry of Land and Resources, operational control of the 
                                                 
35 Henry Sanderson and Michael Forsythe, “China Boosts Defense Spending as Military Modernizes Arsenal,” 
Bloomberg News, March 5, 2013. 
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Administration’s maritime law enforcement forces was assigned to the Ministry of Public 
Security.36 
The Distorting Influence of Bureaucratic Rank  
Chinese political culture features carefully observed systems of ranks that identify the relative 
importance of people, official agencies, public institutions, state-owned corporations, and 
geographic units. Rank consciousness affects the way that officials and their agencies interact 
with each other. Most damagingly, it contributes to the political system’s difficulty in achieving 
successful inter-agency coordination and frequently undermines lines of authority.  
Among the rules that govern rank in China is that entities of equivalent rank cannot issue binding 
orders to each other. Often, they cannot even compel coordination, although Party entities and 
security agencies have more clout in that respect than other entities. An entity of lesser rank 
seeking to coordinate with an entity of higher rank faces a daunting challenge. Many analysts 
attribute the well documented communication problems between the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) and the Foreign Ministry to the large gap in their respective ranks. The PLA’s Central 
Military Commission is of equivalent rank to the State Council, China’s cabinet, while the 
Foreign Ministry is a mere ministry under the State Council. For the Foreign Ministry to liaise 
with the PLA, it must report up to the State Council, which may have to report up further up to 
the Politburo in order to secure PLA cooperation.37  
In another example of the distorting influence of rank, state-owned enterprises sometimes outrank 
the Party and state leaders in the geographic jurisdictions in which they are based, making it 
impossible for the local government to issue binding orders to them.38 The rank system can also 
impede effective regulatory oversight when regulators share the same bureaucratic rank as entities 
they are charged with regulating. For example, while China’s banking regulator, the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), has ministerial rank, and China’s five largest banks 
have quasi-ministerial rank, at the province level they have equal rank, resulting in resistance 
from the banks’ provincial branches to the provincial CBRC’s oversight.39  
One solution periodically proposed for some of these rank-related governance issues is to abolish 
administrative ranks for the leaders of state-owned enterprises, financial institutions, and 
universities. In 2000, a central government commission issued trial “basic norms” requiring large 
                                                 
36 “China to Restructure Oceanic Administration, Enhance Maritime Law Enforcement,” Xinhua News Agency, March 
10, 2013. 
37 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace scholar Michael Swaine reports that within the PLA, rank differences 
can impede coordination between the units in charge of operations and training, which are more senior in the PLA 
hierarchy, and those in charge of foreign affairs and intelligence, which are more junior, even when training exercises 
have foreign policy implications. Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior Part Three: The Role of the Military 
in Foreign Policy,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 36 (January 6, 2012), p. 9, http://www.hoover.org/publications/
china-leadership-monitor/article/104181. 
38 The Brookings Institution’s Kenneth Lieberthal makes this point as part of an insightful discussion of the role of rank 
in the Chinese political system in Kenneth Lieberthal, Managing the China Challenge: How to Achieve Corporate 
Success in the People’s Republic (Brookings Institution Press, 2011), pp. 50-52. 
39  “全关全全全全关 全 全科全全全 全全议 议论 议 议议” (“National Financial Work Meeting Will Discuss Reform of 
Administrative Ranks for Financial Institutions”), 21世 世纪纪纪习  (21st Century Business Herald), December 5, 2006. 
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/1040/5124620.html. The five banks in question are ICBC, Agricultural Bank of 
China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and Bank of Communications. 
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and medium-sized state-owned enterprises to give up administrative rank, but so far only the 
cities of Shanghai and Guangzhou have shown any interest in implementing it.40 One reason for 
the slow pace of reform may be the unwillingness of corporate and educational leaders to give up 
the array of privileges that accompany administrative rank. According to a 2012 article in China’s 
respected Southern Weekend newspaper, officials with the rank of full ministers are assigned a car 
costing up to $71,000, with a full-time driver; provided state funds for the purchase of residences 
up to 2,400 square feet in size; and given access to exclusive health care, including single-person 
VIP hospital rooms and the convenience of having all medical bills automatically settled by the 
Ministry of Health. All those privileges continue for life, with health privileges being the most 
prized. Retired full minister-rank officials are also assigned a full-time secretary for life.41 
A long-time challenge for the U.S.-China relationship has been that China considers U.S. Cabinet 
Secretaries to be of equivalent rank to Chinese ministers, rather than to China’s more senior vice 
premiers and state councilors. The creation of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
(S&ED) allowed the United States to bypass the rank system and find a way for the U.S. 
Secretaries of the Treasury and State to deal directly with their real counterparts above the 
ministerial level. The U.S. Secretary of Defense, however, is still hosted by the Chinese Minister 
of Defense, who is the third most senior uniformed member of the Central Military Commission 
and is outside the operational chain of command. 
Table 2. Select Chinese Institutions and Their Bureaucratic Ranks 
Rank Institutions
Full State （正国级） Communist Party Central Committee; Party and State Central Military 
Commissions; The State Council; National People’s Congress Standing 
Committee; Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference National 
Committee; State Presidency 
Quasi State （ 副国级）  Communist Party Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission (the Party’s graft-
fighting arm); Supreme People’s Court; Supreme People’s Procuratorate (the 
public prosecutor’s office) 
Ministry/Province （ 正正正级 ) 
 
Party departments (e.g. Party Organization Department, Party Propaganda 
Department); ministries, commissions, and general administrations; regulatory 
commissions (e.g., for banking, insurance, and securities); provinces and 
autonomous regions; municipalities under the central government (Beijing, 
Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing); Hong Kong and Macau; “mass organizations” 
such as the Communist Youth League and the All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions; the Xinhua News Agency; research academies (the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the Chinese Academy of 
Engineering) 
Quasi Ministry/Province Rank 
(副正正级) 
State bureaus, offices, and administrations (e.g., State Statistical Bureau, State 
Intellectual Property Office, State Oceanic Administration, and State Food and 
Drug Administration); 15 cities (Changchun, Chengdu, Dalian, Hangzhou, Harbin, 
Guangzhou, Ji’nan, Nanjing, Ningbo, Qingdao, Shenyang, Shenzhen, Wuhan, 
Xiamen, and Xi’an); China’s five largest banks and four largest insurance 
companies; dozens of large state enterprises (e.g., the China National Tobacco 
Corporation); 32 universities 
Source: Chinese media reports. 
                                                 
40 Wu Jie, “副部级央企再增四家,” (“Four More Quasi-Ministerial Rank Central Enterprises Added”), Southern 
Weekend, March 20, 2012, http://www.infzm.com/content/73097.  
41 Qian Haoping, “科关中中中‘部议 位单’ ?” (“How Many “Ministerial-Level” Units Does China Have?”), 南南南南 
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Weak Rule of Law 
A long-standing source of frustration for U.S. government officials is the seeming inability or 
unwillingness of their Chinese counterparts to enforce policies, decisions, regulations, and laws, 
much less the state constitution. Scholars of China have identified many factors that contribute to 
this situation. A fundamental one is considered to be the Chinese Communist Party’s attitude 
toward the law. The Party is widely perceived to support rule by law—law as a tool for 
governance—but not rule of law. The Party is particularly unwilling to submit itself to legal 
restraints. As noted earlier, although the Party is China’s dominant political institution, with its 
leadership mentioned five times in the preamble to the state constitution, the Party and its 
bureaucracy are not mentioned in any of the articles of the constitution, leaving an unclear legal 
basis for the Party’s powers. The Party holds itself above the law when it insists that judicial 
authorities cannot investigate Party members without the Party’s consent. In the case of a Party 
official accused of wrongdoing, such as the former Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai, for 
example, the Party conducts its own investigation and then chooses whether to hand the accused 
over to the state judiciary.42 The Party also explicitly denies the judiciary independence, insisting 
that Party Commissions of Politics and Law oversee the work of the police, the prosecutor’s 
office, and the courts. The commissions are empowered to intervene to obtain outcomes in the 
Party’s interest, undermining the authority of the law. In a 2012 article, the Vice President of 
China’s Supreme Court rued the fact that for officials across China, economic development is 
“the first imperative,” and preserving stability is “the first responsibility,” whereas ruling lawfully 
is a “second or third” tier consideration.43 Civil society groups have long lobbied for a greater role 
in monitoring enforcement of rules and regulations, but the CCP continues to resist, fearing 
empowering groups outside its control.  
Factionalism  
Although China is effectively a one party state, multiple coalitions, factions, and constituencies 
exist within the political system. Political mentorship, place of birth, the affiliations of one’s 
parents, and common educational or work history may lead individuals to form political alliances. 
Former Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin, for example, was known for promoting and relying 
upon a group of officials he had known from his days as Mayor and then Party Secretary of 
Shanghai, who also shared his interest in fast-paced economic growth and breaking down 
ideological barriers to the growth of the private sector. Jiang emerged from retirement before the 
Communist Party’s 18th National Congress in November 2012 and is reported to have played an 
outsized role in placing factional allies on the new Politburo Standing Committee that emerged 
from the Congress. Former Party General Secretary Hu Jintao, for his part, promoted a number of 
officials who, like him, worked for the Communist Youth League. Increasingly, scholars see 
competition within the party and the state based on bureaucratic constituencies, too. The Ministry 
of Industry and Information Technology backs industry, for example, against the Ministry of 
Environment, which seeks to rein in industrial pollution.  
                                                 
42 Bo was expelled from the Communist Party in September 2012. The Party announced in January 2013 that he had 
been handed over to the judicial authorities. No trial date has yet been set.  
43 江江江 (Jiang Bixin), “关关南关关 关关关关关 关关 关关 关关义 义 义义 论 ” (“Theoretical Thinking on Certain Questions Related 
to Building a Socialist Country Ruled by Law”), 关 理论论  (Theoretical Horizon), June 2012, p. 12. 
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The Bo Xilai Affair
On April 10, 2012, the Communist Party suspended one of its top leaders, Bo Xilai, from his posts on the Party’s 
Politburo and Central Committee, and announced that the Party’s graft-fighting arm, the Central Discipline Inspection 
Commission, would be investigating him for alleged “serious discipline violations.” The Party had removed Bo from 
his post as Party Secretary of powerful Chongqing Municipality just weeks earlier, on March 15. Also on April 10, 
China’s official Xinhua News Agency announced that Bo’s wife, Gu Kailai, had been handed over to state judicial 
authorities on suspicion of involvement in the November 2011 murder in Chongqing of a British businessman. The 
authorities indicated that the investigation into the alleged murder was spurred by information provided by Bo’s 
former police chief and vice mayor in Chongqing, Wang Lijun, who sparked headlines around the world when he 
sought refuge in the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu for approximately 30 hours on February 6 and 7, 2012, before giving 
himself up to Chinese security officials. 
Coming ahead of a sweeping generational leadership transition at the 18th Party Congress, Bo’s ouster up-ended the 
Party’s effort to present the transition as smooth and uneventful. Bo’s fall raised questions about the unity of the 
Party’s remaining top leadership and the loyalty of segments of the military to the Party. As details of the Bo family’s 
wealth emerged, it also highlighted the degree to which the families of top Party officials have been able to parlay 
access to political power into vast personal wealth, information that risks further harming the Party’s already fragile 
legitimacy. Finally, with the role micro-bloggers played in moving events in the Bo saga forward, the Bo affair 
highlighted the challenge the Communist Party faces in controlling information and narratives in a social media age. 
Bo’s vice mayor appears to have sealed Bo’s fate when he took his allegations against his boss to U.S. diplomats, thus 
ensuring that the allegations could not be contained. Until then, Bo appeared to be riding high. Media-savvy and 
relishing the limelight, he had drawn national attention by styling himself as a champion of the poor and dispossessed, 
throwing his support behind the state-owned economy, leading a brutal crackdown on alleged organized crime 
bosses, and fanning nostalgia for the more egalitarian ethos of the Mao Zedong era, including by encouraging the mass 
singing of “red” songs from the chaotic and violent Cultural Revolution movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Bo’s 
egalitarian rhetoric was implicitly critical of Party General Secretary Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao’s failure to 
narrow one of the world’s starkest wealth gaps. His supporters included those uncomfortable with the ideological 
compromises and broken promises to the working class that have accompanied China’s rise to become the world’s 
second-largest economy. Riding his notoriety, Bo was widely reported to be angling for promotion to the Party’s top 
decision-making body, the Politburo Standing Committee. 
Bo’s wife was convicted of murder in August 2012. Bo’s vice mayor was convicted of “bending the law for selfish 
ends, defection, abuse of power and bribe-taking” in September 2012.44 Days later, the Party Politburo expelled Bo 
from the Party’s ranks and announced that it was transferring his case to state judicial authorities. The Party 
investigation concluded that Bo “bore major responsibility” in the cases of his vice-mayor’s flight to the U.S. consulate 
and his wife’s involvement in the murder, and alleged that he “took advantage of his office to seek profits for others 
and received huge bribes personally and through his family.”45 The new collective Party leadership now faces the same 
challenge that faced their predecessors: convincing Bo’s supporters that the allegations against Bo and his wife are 
genuine, and not a pretext for disposing of a political and ideological challenger. With the 18th Party Congress behind 
them, however, the stakes are now lower. The next stage in the saga will be Bo’s trial. No date has yet been set.  
Corruption  
Corruption in China is widespread. Among its forms are lavish gifts and expensive meals 
bestowed on officials by those seeking favors; bribes explicitly provided in exchange for permits, 
approvals, and jobs; privileged opportunities offered to officials or their extended families to 
acquire corporate shares, stock, and real estate; embezzlement of state funds; and exemption of 
friends, relatives, and business associates from enforcement of laws and regulations. As China’s 
economy has expanded over the last 30 years, the scale of corruption has grown dramatically. A 
                                                 
44 “Wang Lijun Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison,” Xinhua News Agency, September 24, 2012, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/24/c_131868689.htm. 
45 “Bo Xilai Expelled from CPC, Public Office,” Xinhua News Agency, September 28, 2012, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/28/c_131880079.htm. 
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2011 report released by China’s central bank estimated that from the mid-1990s to 2008, corrupt 
officials who fled overseas took with them $120 billion in stolen funds.46 Estimates of illicit 
financial flows out of China are many times higher. In a 2012 report, Global Financial Integrity, a 
Washington, DC-based research and advocacy organization, estimated that total illicit financial 
flows out of China in the decade from 2001 through 2010 amounted to $2.74 trillion, with $420 
billion leaving China illicitly in 2010 alone.47 The international non-governmental organization 
Transparency International ranks China 80th on its Corruption Perceptions Index, with the top 
ranking countries being the least corrupt. China ranks just below Sri Lanka and above Serbia. The 
United States is ranked 19th.48  
Immediately following his appointment as Communist Party General Secretary in November 
2012, Xi Jinping identified corruption and graft within the Party as “pressing problems.” He 
pledged to “work with all comrades in the party, to make sure the party supervises its own 
conduct and enforces strict discipline.”49 Many observers believe, however, that the Party’s 
insistence on supervising its own conduct, rather than accepting supervision from outside, has 
been part of the reason that corruption has flourished. Critics charge, moreover, that when the 
Party’s corruption-fighting agency, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, conducts 
investigations, they are frequently politically motivated, even if they uncover real wrongdoing. 
Officials who keep on the right side of their superiors and colleagues may engage in large-scale 
corruption, while other officials may be investigated for lesser infractions because they have 
fallen afoul of powerful officials. 
Media commentators and academics have suggested a variety of measures to tackle corruption, 
including allowing the media to play more of a watchdog role and requiring officials to make 
their family assets public. So far, neither proposal has advanced significantly.Journalists who 
expose wrongdoing do so at their peril. In recent years, however, microbloggers have successfully 
exposed a string of corrupt officials. In one high-profile case, microbloggers drew attention to 
photographs of a local official showing him wearing at least 11 different luxury wristwatches on 
various occasions. Just one of the timepieces was worth more than twice the man’s annual 
salary.50  
                                                 
46 “Chinese Officials Stole $120 Billion, Fled Mainly to US,” BBC News, June 17, 2011. 
47 “New Report Finds Crime, Corruption, and Tax Evasion at Near-Historic Highs in 2010,” Global Financial Integrity 
(a program of the Center for International Policy), December 17, 2012, http://www.gfintegrity.org/content/view/592/
70/. 
48 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, December 5, 2012, http://www.transparency.org/
cpi2012/results. 
49 “Xi Jinping’s first public address,” CNN.com, November 15, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/15/world/asia/
china-xi-jinping-speech/index.html. Xi’s personal credentials for corruption-fighting came under question even before 
his appointment as Party leader, when Bloomberg News reported that members of his extended family had accumulated 
hundreds of millions of dollars in assets in such sectors as minerals, real estate, and mobile-phone equipment. 
Bloomberg did not trace any assets to Xi personally, however, or to his wife or daughter. Michael Forsythe, Shai Oster, 
Natasha Khan, and Dune Lawrence, “Xi Jinping Millionaire Relations Reveal Fortunes of Elite,” Bloomberg, June 29, 
2012. 
50 Wang Yong, “A fancy watch is corruption tipoff,” Shanghai Daily, September 20, 2012. 
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China’s Political Institutions in Detail 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
The Communist Party’s 82.6 million members constitute approximately 6% of China’s population 
of 1.34 billion. Any Chinese citizen over the age of 18 who is willing to accept and abide by the 
Party’s constitution and policies, which include a requirement that Party members be atheists, can 
apply for Party membership. In 2011, however, of 21.6 million applicants, fewer than 15% were 
accepted. The Party is heavily male, with female members making up less than a quarter of the 
total. Nearly 85% of members work for the Party or the State.51 Party membership is considered 
prestigious, although not to the degree that it was in earlier eras. 
Every Party member, irrespective of position, is required to be organized into a branch, cell, or 
other specific unit of the Party to participate in the regular activities of the Party organization. 
Party units exist in all official and semi-official organizations and institutions, including state-
owned enterprises and universities. As of the end of 2011, they also existed in nearly 1 million 
private businesses and foreign-owned enterprises and in nearly every officially registered civil 
society organization.52 These Party bodies can wield great power within an institution, even 
though in some cases, as in foreign-owned companies, they may have little formal authority. With 
the Party controlling all avenues for public sector advancement, it is thought that many young 
people join the Party for career reasons. 
Party policy is communicated down the layers of the Party organization by means of directives 
and Party committee meetings. The Party also ensures ideological conformity through nationwide 
study campaigns. In September 2008, for example, the Party launched an 18-month-long 
campaign for Party members to study Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao’s “scientific 
concept of development.” Party members throughout the system were required to study speeches 
and documents related to the concept. Party publishing houses published study guides. In another 
example, in 2009, as part of a broader study campaign on “the theory of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics,” the Party’s Propaganda Department ordered Party organizations nationwide to 
lead study sessions on a set of concepts known as the “Six Why’s.” Among the six why’s were 
why separation of powers and a Western-style multi-party system were not right for China.53 
                                                 
51 “China Communist Party members exceed 82 mln,” Xinhua News Agency, June 30, 2012; “科 部组 全关以员 万万: 8260.2  
基 以层 组层 万万402.7 ,” (“Central Organization Department: 82.602 million Party members nationwide, 4.027 million 
grassroots Party organizations,” Xinhua News Agency, July 1, 2012. 
52 “科 部组 全关以员 万万基 以层 组层 万万: 8260.2  402.7 ,” (“Central Organization Department: 82.602 Million Party Members 
Nationwide, 4.027 Million Grassroots Party Organizations,” Xinhua News Agency, July 1, 2012. 
53  Theory Bureau, CCP Central Committee Propaganda Department, Six “Why's”: Answers to Some Important 
Questions (六六 什什为‘ ’： 几六几几 几几几对 对对 ）  (Study Press 以 学学南习 , 2009). 
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Figure 3. The National-Level Communist Party Hierarchy 
The Politburo Standing Committee is the Most Powerful Decision-Making Body 
 
 
Source: 中共中央组织结构图 (Organizational Structure Chart of the Communist Party Central Committee), 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/351757/index.html. 
Party Leadership Bodies 
At the top of the Party’s hierarchy, the most powerful policy- and decision-making entity is the 
Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), currently comprised of seven men. They are all members 
of the broader Politburo, which has a membership of 25. The PSC and the Politburo are 
supported by the seven-man Party Secretariat. Politburo members are all members of the 
broadest senior grouping of Communist Party officials, the Central Committee, which has 205 
full members and 171 alternate members (see Figure 3 for an illustration of the Party hierarchy). 
As noted above, each member of the PSC has a rank, from one to seven, and is responsible for a 
specific portfolio. (See “Collective Leadership.”) To ensure Party control, the top-ranked 
members of the PSC serve concurrently as the heads of other parts of the political system. The top 
ranked PSC member, Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, for example, serves concurrently as 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and as State President. The second-, third-, and 
fourth-ranked PSC members serve respectively as State Premier and as heads of the NPC and the 
CPPCC. 
PSC members also head Party “Leading Small Groups” (LSGs) for their policy areas. LSGs are 
secretive bodies intended to facilitate cross-agency coordination in implementation of Politburo 
Standing Committee decisions. The National Security Leading Small Group and the Foreign 
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Affairs Leading Small Group, for example, were both headed by Hu Jintao when he was 
Communist Party General Secretary, and are believed to be headed by Xi Jinping now.54 
The next highest decision-making body is the full Politburo. Table 3 breaks down the 25 
members into several categories. The current Politburo has only two female members, State 
Councilor Liu Yandong and Tianjin Party Secretary Sun Chunlan. Because of its relatively 
unwieldy size and the geographic diversity of its members, the full Politburo is not involved in 
day-to-day decision-making. In 2012, it is reported to have met eight times, with its meetings 
often focused on a single major policy area or on preparations for major national meetings.55 
Table 3. The18th Central Committee’s Politburo (Political Bureau) 
Appointed at the first plenum of the 18th Central Committee, November 2012 
Category Politburo Members 
Politburo Standing Committee Members (7) Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Zhang Dejiang, Yu 
Zhengsheng, Liu Yunshan, Wang Qishan, Zhang 
Gaoli 
Provincial Party Secretaries (6) • Guo Jinlong (Beijing) 
• Han Zheng (Shanghai)  
• Hu Chunhua (Guangdong) 
• Sun Chunlan (Tianjin) 
• Sun Zhengcai (Chongqing) 
• Zhang Chunxian (Xinjiang) 
Military Officers (2) • Gen. Fan Chenglong, Vice Chairman, Party 
Central Military Commission 
• Gen. Xu Qiliang, Vice Chairman, Party Central 
Military Commission. 
                                                 
54 For a discussion of the PSC under Xi Jinping’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, see Alice L. Miller, “The Politburo Standing 
Committee under Hu Jintao,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 35 (September 21, 2011), http://www.hoover.org/
publications/china-leadership-monitor/article/93646. For a discussion of the history of Leading Small Groups and their 
current role, see Alice L. Miller, “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups,” China Leadership Monitor, 
no. 26 (September 2, 2008), http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/article/5689. 
55 The website of the Party Central Committee’s mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, contains a list of Politburo meetings 
and their agendas going back to 2002. For meetings of the current Politburo see http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2012/1119/
c352110-19621695.html. The annual lists are not always complete, however. In reporting the Party’s decision to expel 
Bo Xilai from the Party, for example, the Xinhua News Agency reported the Politburo had met on April 10, 2012, for a 
briefing on the investigation into actions by Bo’s former police chief and Bo’s wife. Yet that April 10, 2012, meeting is 
missing from the official list of Politburo meetings. “Bo Xilai Expelled from CPC, Public Office,” Xinhua News 
Agency, September 28, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/28/c_131880079.htm. 
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Category Politburo Members 
Heads of Communist Party Central Committee 
Departments, Commissions, and Offices (5) 
• Li Zhanshu, Member of Party Secretariat; Director 
of Central Committee General Office; Party 
Secretary of Working Committee of the Organs 
Directly Under the Central Committee 
• Liu Qibao, Member of Party Secretariat; Head of 
Central Committee Propaganda Department 
• Meng Jianzhu, Head of Central Commission of 
Politics and Law 
• Wang Huning, Director, Central Committee 
Policy Research Office  
• Zhao Leji, Member of Party Secretariat; Head of 
Central Committee Organization Department 
State Officials (4) • Li Yuanchao, State Vice President 
• Liu Yandong, Vice Premier 
• Wang Yang, Vice Premier 
• Ma Kai, Vice Premier; Party Secretary of Central 
State Organs Work Committee; President, Chinese 
Academy of Governance 
National People’s Congress Official (1) Li Jianguo, Vice Chairman, NPC Standing Committee; 
Chairman, All-China Trade Unions 
Source: Xinhua News Agency biographies. 
Notes: All members born before 1950 are expected to retire at the 19th Party Congress in 2017. Five of the 
seven Politburo Standing Committee members and 6 of the 18 regular members of the Politburo were born 
before 1950. 
Although the seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee are ranked, from one to seven, regular 
Politburo members are of equal rank and are listed here alphabetically. 
According to the Party’s constitution, the PSC and Politburo derive their power from the Central 
Committee, whose full and alternate members together “elect” the Politburo, Politburo Standing 
Committee, and Party General Secretary, and “decide” on the composition of the Party’s Central 
Military Commission.56 In practice, incumbent top officials provide a list of nominees to the 
Central Committee, which ratifies it.57 The 17th Central Committee (including alternates), whose 
term concluded in November 2012, was made up of leaders from the provinces (41.5%), central 
ministries (22.6%), the military (17.5 %), central Party organizations (5.9%), and state-owned 
                                                 
56 The Party’s constitution, which was most recently revised in 2007, is available in English at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/25/content_6944738.htm and in Chinese at http://news.xinhuanet.com/
ziliao/2002-11/18/content_633225.htm. 
57 In 2007, the process for development of the nominees list was modestly more inclusive than previously. The Party 
leadership drew up a list of nearly 200 candidates for nominations and then invited all full and alternate members of the 
Central Committee and other unidentified Party figures to vote upon them. The Party leadership reportedly drew upon 
the results of this straw poll in developing its final list of 25 Politburo nominees for Central Committee ratification, 
although it was not bound by the straw poll’s results. Alice Miller, “The Road to the 18th Party Congress,” China 
Leadership Monitor, no. 36 (January 6, 2012), p. 9, http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/
article/104231. 
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enterprises, educational institutions, “mass organizations” such as the Communist Youth League, 
and other constituencies (12.4%).58  
The Central Committee, in turn, is elected by the approximately 2,000 delegates to Party 
National Congresses, which are held every five years. Congress delegates also approve the Party 
General Secretary’s report to the Congress, which serves as a statement of the Party’s positions 
and an outline of the Party’s agenda for the coming five years.  
In the years between Party Congresses, the Central Committee is required to meet at least once a 
year, with each meeting known as a plenum (or plenary session). Plenums usually focus on 
setting the direction for the country in a specific area, while also approving major personnel 
decisions. In October 2010, for example, the Fifth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee 
discussed and approved a draft of the 12th Five-Year Plan for China’s economy, covering the years 
2011 to 2015. It also approved the appointment of Xi Jinping to be first vice chairman of the 
CMC, a move widely seen as the last step in Xi’s preparation to become the top ranked official in 
the Communist Party in 2012. At the end of each plenum, the Party issues a public document, 
known as a communiqué, announcing the major decisions taken. 
The Party Bureaucracy 
Under the Central Committee and the Party Secretariat, the CCP operates an expansive 
bureaucracy that reaches into many aspects of government and society, and parts of which extend 
deep down into local governments.59 The Party’s anti-corruption body, the Central Discipline 
Inspection Commission, is represented on the Politburo Standing Committee. The heads of the 
next three most powerful departments in the Party bureaucracy sit one level lower, on the 
Politburo. Those departments are: 
• The Organization Department: responsible for the recruitment of Party 
members and their training, career development, and assignment to jobs across 
the party and state, the legislatures, state-owned corporations, universities, and 
other public institutions.60 
• The Propaganda (or “Publicity”) Department: responsible for the Party’s 
messaging and for control of the media and ideology. In coordination with the 
Organization Department, the Propaganda Department manages the leaders of the 
Ministry of Culture; the newly constituted General Administration Press and 
Publication, Radio, Film, and Television; the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences; The People’s Daily; the Xinhua News Agency; and other media 
organizations.61  
                                                 
58 Cheng Li, “A Pivotal Stepping-Stone: Local Leaders’ Representation on the 17th Central Committee,” China 
Leadership Monitor, no. 23 (January 23, 2008), p. 1, http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/
article/5772. 
59 For a full list of departments, commissions, and offices under the Central Committee, in Chinese, see 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64114/. 
60 For more information, see 中中中中 中 中 中组组 组 组  (An Introduction to the Functions of the Party Central Committee 
Organization Department), on the website of The People’s Daily, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64114/75347/
14922667.html.  
61 For more information, see a brief introduction to the Propaganda Department’s functions on the website of The 
People’s Daily, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64114/75332/5230610.html. 
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• The Central Commission of Politics and Law:62 responsible for ensuring Party 
control over the internal security apparatus. Its full membership is not publicized. 
Known members include the President of the Supreme People’s Court, the 
Procurator-General of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (China’s chief 
prosecutor), the Minister of Public Security, the Minister of State Security, and 
the Minister of Justice.63  
Notable departments not represented at levels below the Politburo include the United Front 
Work Department, which is responsible for relations with the people of Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
and Macau, non-Communist groups, and ethnic minorities and Chinese living outside mainland 
China. The International Department handles relations with foreign political parties. It is a 
particularly influential player in China’s relationships with fellow socialist countries, including 
North Korea. The Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group Office coordinates foreign policy. 
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
The Party’s 2.25 million person army, the People’s Liberation Army, reports to both a Party 
Central Military Commission (CMC) and a State CMC. Party General Secretary Xi Jinping 
heads both and the two bodies have identical memberships. They are effectively a single body, 
with the Party CMC the real locus of authority, exercising unified command over all China’s 
armed forces. The Party CMC currently has a civilian chairman, two uniformed vice chairmen, 
and eight uniformed regular members. The eight are the Minister of Defense, the directors of the 
PLA’s four headquarters departments, and the commanders of the Navy, Air Force, and strategic 
missile forces, known as the Second Artillery Corps. (See Table 4 for details.) 
Table 4. The 18th Central Committee’s Party Central Military Commission 
Appointed at the First Plenum of the 18th Central Committee, November 2012; Listed in rank order 
Name and Year of 
Birth CMC Position Other Position(s) 
Xi Jinping (b. 1953) Chairman Party General Secretary; 
State President; State 
CMC Chairman 
Fan Changlong (b. 1947) Vice Chairman Party Politburo Member 
Xu Qiliang (b. 1950) Vice Chairman Party Politburo Member 
Chang Wanquan (b. 1949) Member State Councilor and 
Minister of National 
Defense 
Fang Fenghui (b. 1951) Member Chief, PLA General Staff 
Zhang Yang (b. 1951) Member Director, PLA General 
Political Department 
                                                 
62 The Chinese name for the commission is 中中中中中中中. It is also known in English as the “Central Committee of 
Political Science and Law” and as the “Central Commission for Political and Legal Affairs.” 
63  All five organizations are described as members of the commission in “周周周： 中中政政政 政政 政政政政政政政政政积 积 ” 
(Zhou Yongkang: Politics and Law Commission Authorities Must Respond Positively to the Concerns and 
Expectations of the Masses),” Xinhua News Service, March 19, 2012,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2012-03/19/
c_111675353.htm. 
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Name and Year of 
Birth CMC Position Other Position(s) 
Zhao Keshi (b. 1947) Member Director, PLA General 
Logistics Department 
Zhang Youxia (b. 1950) Member Director, PLA General 
Armament Department 
Wu Shengli (b. 1945) Member Commander, PLA Navy 
Ma Xiaotian (b. 1949) Member Commander, PLA Air 
Force 
Wei Fenghe (b. 1954) Member Commander, PLA Second 
Artillery Corps 
Source: Xinhua News Agency biographies; CRS research. 
Notes: All members born before 1950 are expected to retire at the 19th Party Congress in 2017. Five of the 11 
members fall into that category. 
The CMC directs the armed forces through the four general departments, listed below in order of 
rank:64 
• General Staff Department: responsible for operations, intelligence, training, 
force structure, mobilization, and foreign affairs; 
• General Political Department: responsible for Communist Party affairs, 
personnel, military media, and security; 
• General Logistics Department: responsible for financial affairs and audits; 
housing, food, uniforms, and other supplies; military healthcare; military 
transportation; and capital construction; and 
• General Armament Department: responsible for the PLA’s weapons and 
equipment needs, its electronics and information infrastructure, and the manned 
space program 
The four general departments direct the service branches: the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and 
the Second Artillery Corps. They also direct the seven military regions, also known as military 
area commands or theaters of war. The PLA Reserve Force and a paramilitary force, the People’s 
Armed Police Force, which plays a major role in putting down domestic unrest, both report to 
both the Central Military Commission and the State’s leading body, the State Council (see Figure 
4 for an organization chart).  
The PLA’s role in politics has been much debated. One leading U.S. expert describes the Party as 
having made “a deliberate decision to remove the military from elite politics and the most 
powerful decision-making councils, and to regularize and institutionalize its role in the policy 
process as a professional force.” As evidence of that trend, he cites statistics on uniformed 
military representation on top Party bodies. The Communist Party’s top decision-making body, 
the PSC, has had no uniformed military representation since 1997. Uniformed military officers 
hold just 2 of the current 25 spots on the Politburo, although nearly 20% of the members of the 
                                                 
64 “Structure and Organization of the Armed Forces,” PRC Ministry of National Defense, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/
ArmedForces/index.htm. 
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17th Central Committee had military affiliations. Yet the military has a direct line to the 
Communist Party General Secretary, the top official in the Chinese political system, through the 
Central Military Commission. Senior military officers also sit on Party “Leading Small Groups” 
on such issues as foreign affairs, national security, and Taiwan affairs.65  
Figure 4. The People’s Liberation Army 
 
Source: Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Routledge, 2012), p. 32. Color shading added by CRS. 
Notes: Entities in red are represented on the Central Military Commission. The People’s Armed Police reports 
to both the Central Military Commission and, through the Ministry of Public Security, to the State Council. 
                                                 
65 Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior Part Three: The Role of the Military in Foreign Policy,” China 
Leadership Monitor, no. 36 (January 6, 2012), pp. 3-6, http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/
article/104181. 
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Military officers in academic positions have emerged in recent years as influential and generally 
hawkish media commentators and bloggers, although it is not clear how authoritative their 
statements are. Most are affiliated either with the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS), which 
the PLA describes as its “highest-level research institute and center of military science,” or the 
National Defense University, which educates and trains China’s senior commanding and staff 
officers and military researchers.66  
The State  
The second major institution of the Chinese political structure is the State. During the early 
decades of Communist rule, the Party and the State operated as one under a slogan trumpeting 
“the Party’s absolute and unified leadership.” In the late 1970s, however, the Communist Party 
began moves to separate Party and government functions, authorizing a cabinet, the State 
Council, and “people’s governments” at lower levels to manage the day-to-day administration of 
the country.67 To ensure its control over the State system, the Party still maintains a robust 
presence inside the system. The top officials at each level of the State system routinely hold 
concurrent Party posts, although they often do not publicize them, and Party committees are 
embedded in the State Council, ministries, and government departments at every level. While 
powerful Communist Party bodies that exist in parallel to the State bodies set policy at all levels 
and make major decisions, the State system implements and executes policy. In recent decades, 
State leaders have been particularly focused on managing China’s economy, leaving “political” 
matters, such as ideology, personnel, and security, to the Party. 
The personnel working for the government are civil servants. While most senior government 
officials are CCP members, party membership is not a requirement for higher government 
positions. In 2007, the newly appointed Minister of Health became the first person to rise to 
ministerial rank without being a member of the Communist Party or any of the satellite parties 
loyal to the Communist Party. He joined and became head of one of the minor parties shortly 
before stepping down from the Minister’s post in March 2013. The Minister of Science and 
Technology is chairman of another satellite party, the Zhigong Party.  
China’s highest ranking state officials are the State President (guojia zhuxi) and Vice President 
(guojia fuzhuxi).68 The positions are largely ceremonial and involve few duties. Since 1993, 
however, China’s Communist Party General Secretaries have found it useful to serve concurrently 
as State President because General Secretaries have no counterparts outside the non-Communist 
world. When Hu Jintao traveled to the United States for a state visit in January 2011, he did so in 
his capacity as China’s State President, although his real power derived from his position as 
General Secretary of the Communist Party.  
                                                 
66 Well known commentators include Lieutenant General Ren Haiquan, a Vice President of AMS, and retired Major 
General Luo Yuan, who is affiliated with an AMS research society; Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong, General Zhu 
Chenghu, and Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu of National Defense University; and Colonel Dai Xu, a researcher at an 
institute at Peking University. See David Lague, “Special Report: China’s Military Hawks Take the Offensive,” 
Reuters, January 17, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/17/us-china-hawks-idUSBRE90G00C20130117. 
67 For more information about the establishment of the state system as a separate political institution, see Zhou 
Guanghui, “Towards Good Government: Thirty Years of Administrative Reforms in China,” in The Reform of 
Governance, ed. Yu Keping (Leiden, The Netherlands and Beijing, China: Koninklijke Brill NV and Social Sciences 
Academic Press, 2010), pp. 137-180. 
68 A literal translation for the Chinese names, 主主 and 副主主, would be “chairman” and “vice chairman,” but China’s 
official translation is President and Vice President. 
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The locus of power in the State system is the State Council, China’s cabinet. It is headed by a 
Premier (zongli), also sometimes referred to in English as Prime Minister, who serves 
concurrently on the Party’s Politburo Standing Committee. Because the State system manages the 
economy on a day-to-day basis, the Premier is effectively China’s most senior economic official, 
although he has other portfolios, too. On official organization charts, all ministries report to the 
State Council and ultimately to the Premier. In practice a number of ministries, including the 
Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, and 
the Ministry of Culture, report directly to the Communist Party entities that oversee their work. 
Below the Premier are four State Council Vice Premiers, one of whom (Zhang Gaoli) serves 
concurrently on the Politburo Standing Committee, and the remainder of whom serve 
concurrently as regular members of the Communist Party Politburo. Slightly below the Vice 
Premiers in rank are five State Councilors, none of whom serve on the Politburo. Each Vice 
Premier and State Councilor has a specific portfolio. The foreign affairs portfolio is not 
represented at the Vice Premier level or on the Politburo. Rather, China’s most senior diplomat is 
a State Councilor, Yang Jiechi, who oversees the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Table 5. State Council Leaders 
Installed March 2013 
Name 
State Council 
title(s) 
Other titles Birthdate 
Likely portfolio 
Li Keqiang Premier No. 2 ranked 
Politburo Standing 
Committee member 
1955 Government 
administration; 
economy 
Zhang Gaoli No. 1 ranked Vice 
Premier 
No. 7 ranked 
Politburo Standing 
Committee Member 
1946 Assisting the 
Premier; economy 
Liu Yandong No. 2 ranked Vice 
Premier 
Politburo member 1945 Education, science, 
culture, health, and 
sports 
Wang Yang No. 3 ranked Vice 
Premier 
Politburo member 1955 Unknown 
Ma Kai No. 4 ranked Vice 
Premier 
Politburo member; 
Party Secretary of 
Central State 
Organs Work 
Committee; 
President, Chinese 
Academy of 
Governance 
1946 Unknown 
Yang Jing State Councilor; 
Secretary General of 
the State Council 
Member of the Party 
Secretariat 
1953 State Council affairs 
Chang Wanquan State Councilor Minister of National 
Defense 
1949 Military 
Yang Jiechi State Councilor  1950 Foreign Affairs 
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Name 
State Council 
title(s) 
Other titles Birthdate 
Likely portfolio 
Guo Shengkun State Councilor Minister and Party 
Secretary, Ministry 
of Public Security; 
Commissioner 
General of Police 
1954 Public security 
Wang Yong State Councilor Chairman and Party 
Secretary, State-
owned Assets 
Supervision and 
Administration 
Commission 
1955 Unknown 
Source: “The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China,” http://www.gov.cn/gjjg/2005-08/
01/content_18608.htm. 
Notes: Information about likely portfolios represents analysis by CRS, based on the titles each leader holds. 
China does not typically announce the portfolios for its top officials. 
China’s ministries and commissions, which are subordinate to the State Council, are a fractious, 
highly competitive group of institutions with sometimes overlapping jurisdiction. Ministries are 
headed by Ministers and commissions by Chairmen. Each ministry or commission has an 
embedded Communist Party committee that makes major decisions for the institution and 
oversees ideology and personnel matters. In most cases, the Minister or Chairman serves 
concurrently as the head of his institution’s Communist Party committee. One exception is the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the top ranking vice minister has traditionally served as the 
ministry’s party secretary.69  
Despite their subordination to the State Council and CCP, and the CCP’s role in appointing their 
leaders, the ministries can wield decisive tactical influence over policy by virtue of their role in 
drafting laws and regulations and implementing the sometimes ambiguous national policy goals 
set by top leaders. After General Secretary Hu Jintao’s 2006 call for “indigenous innovation” to 
be “the core of national competitiveness,” for example, the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT) led the way in developing often controversial industrial policies and 
regulations to support domestic firms over their foreign rivals, fleshing out just what “indigenous 
innovation” meant. MIIT’s moves included attempts to make a domestic technology the standard 
for 3G mobile telecommunications in China, to require that all new computers in China be sold 
with Chinese-made censorship software pre-installed, and to require preference for domestic 
suppliers in Chinese government procurement.70 Not all ministries and commissions are created 
equal. MIIT and the National Development and Reform Commission, both considered “super-
ministries,” are more powerful in policy debates than other ministries.  
                                                 
69 For more discussion of these issues, see Peng Mei and Ge Qian, “Zhang Zhijun Appointed Secretary of Foreign 
Ministry Party Committee, First-ranking Vice Minister ( 志 志志志志志张 张 委书书排排排排排副志长 ),” Southern Metropolis 
News (南南南南报), December 22, 2010. 
70 James McGregor, China’s Drive for Indigenous Innovation: A Web of Industrial Policies, U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, July 2010, http://www.uschamber.com/reports/chinas-drive-indigenous-innovation-web-industrial-policies. 
Barry Naughton, “China’s Emergence from Economic Crisis,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 29 (August 11, 2009), 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/article/5473. 
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Entities under the State Council include four State Council offices, each with its own professional 
staff. The State Council’s Legislative Affairs Office (SCLAO) plays a frequently decisive role 
in the formulation of national regulations and laws. It drafts the government’s legislative agenda 
on a year-to-year basis and then works with relevant government ministries and agencies to 
implement the agenda, including overseeing the drafting of regulations and laws.71 Regulations 
are promulgated by the State Council or by individual ministries. Laws must be passed by the 
National People’s Congress. The State Council’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office advises 
the Chinese leadership on matters related to the two Special Administrative Regions, both of 
which returned to Chinese sovereignty in the 1990s after long periods as colonies of Britain and 
Portugal respectively. The other two offices are a Research Office and an Overseas Chinese 
Affairs Office. 
The National People’s Congress (NPC) 
The public theater of the NPC’s work is centered on its 10-day-long annual full session. It is held 
every March and attended by all of the NPC’s nearly 3,000 deputies. The full session in March 
2013 marked the start of a new five-year Congress, the 12th, and approved new State and 
Congress leaders, including a new President, Vice President, and Premier, and new Vice Premiers 
and State Councilors. At the annual full sessions, NPC deputies almost always vote to approve the 
reports, laws, and candidates put before them, usually by overwhelming margins. NPC delegates 
do occasionally push back, however. At the March 2013 session of the NPC, 25% of deputies 
withheld their support from the Supreme People’s Court’s report to the Congress, and nearly 22% 
withheld their support from the Ministry of Finance’s budget report.72 Unlike the U.S. Congress, 
the National People’s Congress does not pass spending bills. Rather, it votes to approve the 
budget presented by the Minister of Finance. The power of individual NPC deputies to exercise 
oversight is largely restricted to the right to submit proposals advocating for reforms or 
demanding better implementation of laws or regulations, to which officials are required to 
respond in writing. 
Because the annual full session of the congress is so brief, much of the NPC’s work is undertaken 
by its Standing Committee, which currently has 161 members and convenes every two months.73 
The Standing Committee is composed of recently retired senior Party and state officials, the heads 
of the eight democratic parties, and “leading figures from every field or profession.”74 Other 
important NPC bodies that meet outside of the annual session include nine specialized 
committees of deputies, and six staff and expert bodies under the Standing Committee. Like the 
State Council, the NPC has a Communist Party organization embedded within it. (For more on 
the NPC, see “The Legislature: Strong on Paper, Weak in Practice” and “Weak Rule of Law.”) 
                                                 
71 The Legislative Affairs Office is also responsible for advising the State Council on the legal implications of ratifying 
or participating in international treaties, for issuing legal interpretations of administration regulations, and for reviewing 
local regulations and ministerial and agency regulations for consistency with national-level laws and regulations and 
China’s constitution. For more information, see the Legislative Affairs Office’s Chinese-language website at 
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/jgzn/. 
72  “两两 两两 两报 报 年年年年年年最最获 张5  605 ” (“Highest Number of Opposing Votes for Reports at the Two Congresses 
in Five Years, Supreme People’s Court Gets 605”), Caixin, March 17, 2013. 
73 For a list of National People’s Congress Standing Committee meetings since 2004, see the NPC’s Chinese-language 
website: http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/cwhhy/node_2433.htm. 
74 Jiang Jinsong, op cit. p. 99. 
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Figure 5. The National People’s Congress 
 
Source: “全国人民代表大会” (“National People’s Congress” ), Xinhua News Agency, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-11/15/content_2221419.htm. 
Notes: The members of the nine special committees are all NPC deputies. The members of the six entities 
under the NPC Standing Committee are staff and experts. 
The NPC is the uppermost layer of a nation-wide system of People’s Congresses. These 
congresses are loosely linked together in process and function. Only deputies for the lowest level 
of People’s Congresses are directly elected. Traditionally, even at the lowest level, candidate lists 
are controlled by the Party, and elections are uncontested. Since 2011, however, China has seen a 
wave of independent candidates contesting elections for People’s Congresses in city districts and 
townships. Such candidates have faced forms of official harassment, including intrusive 
surveillance, extra-legal detention, intimidation of their supporters, censorship, and election 
irregularities aimed at keeping them off ballots or preventing their votes from being counted. 
Nonetheless, several independent candidates have succeeded in being elected.75 
The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 
The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) system officially exists to 
engage in “political consultation” with the Communist Party, perform “democratic supervision” 
of the Party, and “participate in the deliberation and administration of state affairs.” The 
Communist Party routinely holds up the PPCC system as a core part of China’s “socialist 
                                                 
75 For details of the sort of harassment faced by independent candidates, see the tale of Liu Ping, a thwarted candidate 
for municipal People’s Congress in Jiangxi Province. Liu Chang, “Why Liu Ping’s Candidacy Failed,” Caixin Online, 
June 7, 2011, http://english.caixin.com/2011-06-07/100266830.html. For information about successful candidates, see 
周 周华 新新新新： 主 主动 动 (Zhou Hualei), “ ,”(“New Branch of Deputies: Actively Contesting Elections”), 南南周南, 
December 30, 2011, http://www.infzm.com/content/67068. See also Congressional Executive Commission on China, 
Annual Report 2012, October 10, 2012, p. 128. 
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democracy,” characterized by “multi-party cooperation and political consultation led by the 
Communist Party of China.”76 In practice, the CPPCC system gives select prominent citizens, 
including non-Communists, an approved platform to make suggestions about aspects of public 
policy, but does not oblige the Communist Party to act upon those suggestions. The institution 
can thus ignite and influence policy debates, but is essentially powerless. The Chinese 
government refers to CPPCC members as “political advisors.” 
The Minor Political Parties 
As mentioned above, in addition to the Chinese Communist Party, China has eight other minor 
political parties. Their role is strictly circumscribed, but the Communist Party uses their existence 
to argue that China operates a “multi-party cooperation system,” and is therefore not strictly a 
one-party state.77 Crucially, the minor political parties are all required to accept the permanent 
leadership of the Communist Party. They are expected to work “hand in hand” with the 
Communist Party in “developing socialism with Chinese characteristics,” and they are barred 
from operating as opposition parties. With each party’s yearly intake of new members capped by 
the Communist Party, the combined members of the minor parties number fewer than 1 million, 
compared to the Communist Party’s 82.6 million members. The smallest of the parties claims a 
membership of just 2,100. The minor parties exercise modest influence in the political system by 
virtue of the Communist Party’s policy of allotting the minor parties leadership positions in the 
state bureaucracy, the legislatures, and the political advisory bodies. The heads of the minor 
parties all serve as vice-chairmen of the National People’s Congress, making them state leaders 
for protocol purposes. In 2007, the current Minister of Science and Technology, Wan Gang, 
became the first minor party member in the post-Mao era to be named to a ministerial post. He 
serves concurrently as chairman of the Zhi Gong Party, whose mandate is to represent Chinese 
who have returned to China after living overseas or who have relatives living overseas.78 As of 
2011, the leadership teams of the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, 
and the ministries, commissions, offices, and bureaus under the State Council included just 19 
non-Communist Party members.79 
Other Political Actors 
In addition to the formal institutions of government and party power, the PRC political system is 
increasingly influenced by other political actors, sometimes referred to as “policy 
entrepreneurs.”80 Some of these influential actors operate opaquely and behind the scenes, 
                                                 
76 National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Nature and Position of the CPPCC, 
June 29, 2010, http://www.cppcc.gov.cn. 
77  For more information about the minor political parties, see State Council Information Office of the People’s 
Republic of China, China’s Political Party System, White Paper, Beijing, China, November 2007, 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6303123.html. 
78 The eight minor parties are the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang (RCCK), China Democratic 
League (CDL), China National Democratic Construction Association (CNDCA), China Association for Promoting 
Democracy (CAPD), Chinese Peasants and Workers Democratic Party (CPWDP), China Zhi Gong Dang (CZGD), Jiu 
San Society, and Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League (TSL). 
79  彭彭 欣华 中中 志统统 ： 中中中中中 中新中志组 Peng Mei and  Xin Hua, “ ” (“Central Committee United Front Work 
Department: China Does Not Need New Political Parties”), 南南南南报 (Southern Metropolitan News), June 30, 2011. 
80 For discussion of the role of policy entrepreneurs in Chinese policymaking, see Andrew Mertha, “‘Fragmented 
(continued...) 
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making it difficult to determine the exact extent of their influence on any given policy issue. 
Others are playing an increasingly visible role in debating, recommending, and influencing 
particular policy actions. The media plays an important role in amplifying the voices of the other 
actors. 
Traditional Media, New Media, and a Wired Citizenry 
Control of the media has always been an important plank of Communist Party rule in China, 
enabling the Party to “guide public opinion” with its version of events, and to exclude narratives 
that might challenge Party positions or actions. Party media controls remain in place, managed by 
the Party Central Committee’s Propaganda Department. With the reduction of state subsidies to 
the traditional media, the rise of commercially driven media, and the rapid spread of new 
information technologies, however, the Chinese media landscape has become increasingly 
diverse, eroding the Party’s ability to control public discourse as comprehensively as it once did.  
Traditional, tightly controlled Communist Party media outlets, such as the Communist Party 
Central Committee’s People’s Daily, now co-exist with more lively commercially driven 
publications. Such publications put a provocative spin on Party-approved news, expose scandals, 
and report on policy debates, even though they may share the same owners as staid Party papers 
and are also subject to Party Propaganda Department censorship. One of China’s most muscular 
tabloids, the Global Times, is a sister paper to the People’s Daily. The crusading Southern 
Metropolis News and Southern Weekend, both known for their daring investigative journalism, are 
sister papers to the mouthpiece of the Guangdong Communist Party Committee, Southern Daily. 
China’s financial media, which tend to be less tightly censored than the mainstream media, often 
showcase some of the most probing analysis of policy issues, with publications such as Caixin 
New Century Weekly and Caijing being particularly closely read by elites. Because of its reach, 
television is the most tightly controlled medium in China. China Central Television (CCTV), 
which operates multiple channels on multiple platforms, serves as a tool of the Communist Party, 
relaying Party-approved messages to China’s citizens. It also, however, hosts numerous talk 
shows and magazine-style programs that offer a range of opinions on policy issues.  
The most significant development in the media landscape in recent years has been the explosive 
growth of Twitter-like services known as “weibo” (literally micro-blogs), which have empowered 
citizens to share news and views directly with each other, and thus put pressure on the traditional 
media to cover stories they might otherwise have ignored, and on the authorities to address 
problems they might otherwise have swept under the carpet. Some micro-bloggers have millions 
of followers and the power to change the terms of public debate with a single post. As of January 
2013, 42.1% of Chinese were online, with the total number of Internet users reaching 564 million. 
Nearly 75% of Chinese users accessed the Internet on mobile devices, and 309 million Chinese 
were weibo users.81 Authorities police weibo posts. In the wake of the scandal involving the 
former Party Secretary of Chongqing, they boasted of deleting 210,000 weibo posts and making 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
Authoritarianism 2.0’: Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process,” The China Quarterly, no. 200 (December 
2009). 
81  China Internet Network Information Center, 第31中国互联网络发展状况统计报告 (31st Statistical Report on 
Internet Development in China), January 15, 2013, http://www.cnnic.cn/gywm/shzr/shzrdt/201301/
t20130115_38518.htm. 
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six arrests for online “rumor mongering.”82 In an attempt to turn weibo to the Party’s advantage, 
however, the CCP has also encouraged official agencies and officials to open weibo accounts as a 
new tool in their propaganda toolboxes, and the official Xinhua News Agency now releases news 
on weibo as well as on its other platforms. Many Chinese officials monitor weibo and other 
Internet discussions as a guide to public opinion, even though in China, as in many societies, 
extreme views tend to dominate Internet-based discourse. Chinese officials sometimes tell foreign 
officials about the pressure they feel from the nationalist views of China’s “netizens,” suggesting 
that it may be a factor in Chinese foreign policy. 
Big Business 
Boosted by government policies restricting foreign investment and private investment in 
“strategic industries,” flagship Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in such fields as oil, 
electric power, finance, telecommunications, and defense have emerged as global powerhouses in 
recent years. Three Chinese SOEs are among the top 10 firms on the Fortune Global 500 list for 
2012.83 The leaders of such firms, and indeed all Chinese SOEs, are assigned to their jobs by the 
Party’s Organization Department and thus may move back and forth between jobs in business and 
government, and have a formal place in the Chinese political system. In the 17th Central 
Committee, 22 SOE bosses were alternate members of the Party’s Central Committee, and 1 was 
a full member.84 The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the 
State Council (SASAC) currently oversees 115 central government-level SOEs.85 
Analysts say SOE bosses are able to influence policymaking and agenda-setting by virtue of their 
bureaucratic rank, their technical knowledge of their industries and global markets, and the 
economic might of their firms. With their career advancement in the Party’s hands, however, SOE 
bosses understand that they are expected not just to produce strong corporate results, but also to 
ensure that their firms advance the Party’s interests.86 
The leaders of the largest private firms are outside the Party’s personnel assignment system, but 
are often also significant players in the Chinese political system. One scholar identifies property 
developers, a group that includes both private and state-owned giants, as “one of the most 
powerful special interest groups in present-day China,” blaming it for holding up passage of an 
anti-monopoly law and resisting government efforts to rein in a dangerous property bubble.87  
                                                 
82  Liu Yang, “清清 万万万万关闭 家家家21  42  (Cleaned Up 210,000 Posts; Closed 42 Websites),” The People’s Daily, April 
13, 2012, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2012-04/13/nw.D110000renmrb_20120413_1-04.htm. 
83  The three are Sinopec Group, China National Petroleum Corporation, and State Grid Corporation of China, ranked 
5th, 6th, and 7th, respectively. CNN Money, Global 500, 2012, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/
2012/full_list/index.html. 
84 Erica Downs and Michal Meidan, “Business and Politics in China: The Oil Executive Reshuffle of 2011,” China 
Security, no. 19 (2011), pp. 3-21. 
85 A full list of central-level SOEs is available, in Chinese, on the SASAC website at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/
n1226/n2425/. 
86 Erica Downs and Michal Meidan, “Business and Politics in China: The Oil Executive Reshuffle of 2011,” China 
Security, no. 19 (2011), pp. 3-21. 
87 Cheng Li, “China’s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing Up for 2012 (Part 4: Top Leaders of Major State-Owned 
Enterprises),” China Leadership Monitor, no. 34 (February 22, 2011), http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-
leadership-monitor/article/68001. 
Understanding China’s Political System  
 
Congressional Research Service 36 
The Party has routinely awarded prominent businesspeople, from both state-owned and privately 
owned firms, positions as deputies to national and local People’s Congresses and Political 
Consultative Conferences. According to Bloomberg News, as of 2011, the richest 70 delegates to 
the National People’s Congress had a combined net worth of $89.8 billion.88 In 2002, the Party 
formally welcomed private business leaders into its ranks. 
Official and Quasi-Official Research Institutes 
According to University of Pennsylvania global rankings that have been embraced in China, the 
country now has 429 think tanks, the second-largest number in the world after the United States, 
with 6 Chinese think tanks ranked among the top 100 globally.89 Most of the institutions on the 
list would be better known in China as public policy research institutes. Many are affiliated 
either with an official agency, such as the Ministry of State Security’s China Institutes for 
Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), or with universities. Such centers make their 
influence felt in the policy process in part by accepting commissions from the Party or state to 
write reports on policy issues, and by self-generating reports that they submit to policymakers. 
Experts attached to the institutes also often serve as formal and informal advisors to official 
bodies, publish broadly, and may maintain a domestic media profile, accepting interviews, 
participating in television chat shows, and penning media commentaries. Such experts also play 
an important role in informing the outside world about Chinese policy discourse through 
meetings at home and abroad with foreign scholars, officials, and visitors from the U.S. Congress, 
as well as through attendance at international conferences and publications in international 
journals. 
Notably, all of the Chinese think tanks named in the University of Pennsylvania survey are 
located in either Beijing or Shanghai, the two cities that dominate the policy discourse in China. 
Only one of the Chinese think tanks named in the rankings could be described as independent 
(Unirule Institute of Economics), and it is in the category of think tanks with small budgets.  
                                                 
88 “China’s Billionaire People’s Congress Makes Capitol Hill Look Like Pauper,” Bloomberg News, February 27, 2012. 
89 James G. McGann, PhD, 2012 Global Go To Think Tanks Report and Policy Advice, Think Tanks and Civil Societies 
Program, University of Pennsylvania, January 28, 2013, http://www.gotothinktank.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/
2012-Global-Go-To-Think-Tank-Report.pdf. 
Top-Ranked Chinese Think Tanks
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (No. 17 among think tanks globally) 
China Institute of International Studies (No. 38 among think tanks globally) 
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (No. 48 among think tanks globally) 
Center for International and Strategic Studies (No. 63 among think tanks globally) 
Shanghai Institutes of International Studies (No. 73 among think tanks globally)  
Development Research Center of the State Council (No. 100 among think tanks globally) 
Central Party School (No. 12 among party-affiliated think tanks globally) 
Unirule Institute of Economics (No. 14 among think tanks globally with operating budgets of less than $5 
million/year) 
Source: University of Pennsylvania, 2012 Global Go To Think Tanks Report and Policy Advice, January 28, 2013. 
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University Academics 
China’s academic community includes more than 1,100 degree-granting institutions.90 Their 
faculty, even if not attached to policy research institutes, may be players in policy debates as 
authors of reports and influential articles and books, as government advisors, and as media 
commentators. More than four dozen Chinese universities are under the management of the 
military or central government ministries other than the Ministry of Education; many of them 
have a direct line into policy as a result.91 Notably, universities in China are not independent. 
They have Communist Party committees that act like Party Committees in other institutions, 
making major decisions for the university and managing ideology, personnel, propaganda, and 
financial matters. As noted above, 32 universities have quasi ministerial bureaucratic rank. (See 
“The Distorting Influence of Bureaucratic Rank.”) The China University Alumni Association 
ranks universities by the number of members of the current Communist Party Central Committee 
they can count among their alumni. The 2013 list is shown in Table 6. 
Table 6. Universities Ranked By Number of Alumni Among Current Communist 
Party Central Committee Members  
Rank University Location 
Number of Alumni 
Who Are Current 
Central Committee 
Members  
1 China Renmin University Beijing 27 
2 Tsinghua University Beijing 26 
3 Peking University Beijing 24 
4 Jilin University Changchun 23 
5 Nankai University Tianjin 12 
5 Harbin Institute of Technology  Harbin 12 
7 Fudan University Shanghai 11 
8 Shandong University Jinan 9 
8 Hunan University Chansha 9 
10 Nanjing University Nanjing 7 
10 Beijing Normal University Beijing 7 
Source: 2013年中国大学中央委员校友排行榜（第十八届） (2013 Ranking of Chinese Universities by 
Central Committee Alumni – 18th Central Committee), 中国校友会网 (China University Alumni Association 
Network), http://www.cuaa.net/cur/2013/11.shtml. 
                                                 
90  The number of degree-granting institutions at the end of 2010 was 1,112. Ministry of Education of the People’s 
Republic of China, 中中中中中中 年年中中中年 年年中业业: 2010  (General Information About Chinese Education: 2010 
National Situation of Development in the Education Field), November 14, 2011, http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/
business/htmlfiles/moe/s5990/201111/126550.html. 
91 A list of universities affiliated with central government ministries and commissions is available on the website of the 
People’s Daily, at http://edu.people.gkcx.eol.cn/schoolInfoSearch/zybw/zybw_1.htm. 
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Officially Sponsored Associations and Societies 
In 2011, China had 1,834 officially registered “social organizations” at the national level, and 
nearly 25,000 at the provincial level. Most are what Western scholars refer to as GONGOs, or 
“government-organized non-government organizations.”92 Some such organizations have been 
criticized as little more than retirement homes for officials who have had to leave office because 
of age limits. Others, however, play an influential role. The fact that GONGO leaders are usually 
recently retired senior officials means that they have status and deep relationships in government 
that can make them effective bureaucratic players. Under-staffed ministries and Communist Party 
departments often outsource parts of their work to GONGOs, from drafting standards and staffing 
legislative drafting committees, to organizing conferences. GONGOs also sometimes act as 
proxies for the government at international meetings. The number of GONGOs that each agency 
sponsors varies. The Foreign Ministry sponsors 14, including the China Arms Control and 
Disarmament Association, a frequent participant in international arms control dialogues. The 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology sponsors 41, many of them industry 
associations that bring perspectives from corporate leaders to bear on policy issues.93  
Grassroots NGOs 
Grassroots non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also exist in China, although in most of the 
country, to be officially registered as “social organizations” they need to find a government 
department willing to serve as their sponsor. Guangdong Province is the first to experiment with a 
policy of waiving this requirement. Unable to line up sponsors, some register as “civil non-
commercial institutions” and others as businesses. Despite official obstacles, which include 
harassment from China’s security apparatus, a number of grassroots NGOs have been successful 
in raising public awareness about such issues as environmental protection and public health and 
in providing services to under-served populations, such as the disabled. The Beijing Yirenping 
Center, for example, focuses on combating discrimination on the basis of health status or 
disability. Yirenping’s advocacy has involved exploiting openings in the Chinese political system 
to draw attention to its causes, usually with the help of sympathetic journalists. Among other 
tactics, it has launched lawsuits, filed official information disclosure requests, organized petitions 
and open letters, and persuaded People’s Congress and People’s Political Consultative Conference 
delegates to submit proposals on their behalf calling for revision of laws discriminating against 
such groups as carriers of Hepatitis B and HIV.94 
                                                 
92  Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 中中中中 中统统 统 (China Civil Affairs Statistical 
Yearbook 2012), ed. Xu Li (中中 中中中统统 /China Statistical Press, 2012), p. 108.  
93 GONGOs can be searched by sponsoring agency on the website of the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs, using a 
Chinese-language search platform accessed at http://www.chinanpo.gov.cn/npowork/dc/searchOrgList.do?action=
searchOrgList. 
94  For examples of recent Yirenping activism, see Many Activities on Human Rights of People with Disability were 
carried out at the Beginning of 2012, Beijing Yirenping report, January 30, 2012, http://www.asiacatalyst.org/blog/
2012/02/Yirenping_Center_Reports_On_Disability_Action.pdf. 
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Chinese Authorities’ View of Political Reform 
China’s Premier Wen Jiabao, who retired in March 2013, made tantalizing comments over the 
years about the need for political reform in China. In a 2008 interview with the U.S. network 
CNN, Wen spoke of the need “to gradually improve the democratic election system,” “build an 
independent and just judicial system,” and have the government “accept oversight by the news 
media and other parties.”95 In a second interview with CNN in 2010, Wen declared that “freedom 
of speech is indispensable,” and that “All political parties, organizations, and all people should 
abide by the constitution and laws without any exception.”96 In March 2012, at a press conference 
marking the closing of the annual full session of the National People’s Congress, Wen spoke of 
the need for “political structural reform,” and particularly of the need for “reform in the 
leadership system of the Party and the state,” although he did not clarify what kind of reform the 
“leadership system” needed. He also startled journalists by embracing the Arab spring, declaring 
that, “The Arab people’s demand and pursuit of democracy must be respected and realistically 
answered. Further, I feel that this trend of democracy is unstoppable by any forces.”97 
Reflecting the diversity of views among top leaders, however, other top officials have instead 
insisted on the limits of political reform in China. In widely reported remarks to the annual full 
session of the National People’s Congress in March 2011, Wu Bangguo, at the time the NPC 
Chairman and the Party’s number two-ranked official, reinforced the Party’s insistence on its 
permanent, unchallenged rule. He declared that China’s leaders had “made a solemn declaration 
that we’ll not employ a system of multiple parties holding office in rotation.” He also foreswore 
any separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers, and any adoption of a bicameral or 
federal system, warning that China would risk an “abyss of internal disorder” if it deviated from 
the “correct political orientation.”98  
Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping echoed Wen’s call for abiding by the constitution 
when he said in December 2012 that no one “has the special right to overstep the Constitution and 
law.”99 He also declared in January 2013 remarks that, “Power should be restricted by the cage of 
regulations.”100 He has not, however, called for an independent judiciary. Rather, he has stressed 
the need “to uphold the principle that the Party should supervise its own conduct.”101  
                                                 
95  CNN, Fareed Zakaria GPS: Interviews with Wen Jiabao, Malcolm Gladwell, August 23 2009, 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0908/23/fzgps.01.html. The Wen interview originally aired on September 
29, 2008. The August 23, 2009, edition of Fareed Zakaria GPS re-broadcast the interview.  
96  CNN, Fareed Zakaria GPS: Interview with Wen Jiabao, October 3, 2010, http://transcripts.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/1010/03/fzgps.01.html. 
97 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Premier Wen Jiabao Meets the Press,” transcript, 
March 15, 2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t914983.htm. For discussion of Wen’s remarks and their reporting 
in China, see Alice L. Miller, “Splits in the Politburo Leadership?” and Joseph Fewsmith, “Political Reform Was Never 
on the Agenda,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 34 (February 22, 2011), http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-
leadership-monitor/article/67996. 
98 Bao Daozu, “Top Legislator Warns of Chaos Unless Correct Path Is Taken,” China Daily, March 11, 2011, online 
edition, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011npc/2011-03/11/content_12152319.htm. 
99 “CPC’s new chief pledges to implement rule of law,” Xinhua News Agency, December 4, 2012; Zhao Yinan, 
“Uphold Constitution, Xi says,” China Daily, December 5, 2012. 
100 “Xi Jinping Vows ‘Power Within Cage of Regulations,’” Xinhua News Agency, January 22, 2013. 
101 “Transcript: Xi Jinping’s Speech at the Unveiling of Then New Chinese Leadership,” South China Morning Post, 
November 15, 2012. 
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Over the years, the Communist Party’s Propaganda Department has been active in justifying the 
Party’s permanent monopoly on power. In a 2009 political tract, Six ‘Why’s’: Answers to Some 
Major Questions, it took on such questions as, “Why must we uphold the system of multi-party 
cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and 
not have a Western-style multi-party system?” Many of the answers the book offered focused on 
claims that Western political systems are inefficient and unable to deliver the kind of fast-paced 
economic growth that China needs to pull all its people out of poverty. Among the many ills 
associated with competitive two-party or multi-party politics, the book argued, are deepened 
social divisions and an unstable political situation, which hobbles economic development.102 
While the Communist Party has shown little to no interest in reforms that might threaten its rule, 
for most of the last 30 years it has been undertaking what a leading Chinese political scientist, Yu 
Keping, calls “reform of state governance and the administrative systems of the state,” intended 
to improve China’s governance in ways that might help solidify the Party’s hold on power.103 
Recent efforts have focused on ways of increasing the legitimacy of the political system by 
making it more competitive, transparent, and participatory, without going so far as to cede the 
Party’s ultimate control over all major decisions.  
In the 1980s, in an effort to foster greater support for local leaders among the community, create 
incentives for more effective local governance, and provide a disincentive for local government 
corruption, the Party sanctioned limited direct elections for leaders at level of the village, an 
administrative unit outside the formal Chinese administrative hierarchy. Those elections continue, 
although village party officials, who are not subject to popular vote, determine what name or 
names may appear on the ballot. The rules also bar candidates from running on behalf of a 
political party or as part of a slate of candidates and restrict public campaigning to a few minutes 
of public remarks immediately before the vote. In his March 2012 press conference, then-Premier 
Wen pronounced village elections a success and said he saw no reason why such direct elections 
could not eventually move up to the level of the township, and even the county.104  
More recent innovations include efforts to introduce elections on a limited scope in workplaces.105 
The Party has also introduced public hearings, begun posting select draft legislation for public 
comment, and adopted a set of open government information regulations to improve the 
transparency of government. Comprehensive ministerial and provincial government websites are 
a product of this initiative.106 Although the Party has touted these and other political reforms with 
great fanfare, they have their limitations and appear to be designed to head off demands for 
                                                 
102 Theory Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee Propaganda Department, 六六 什什为' ’: 
几六几几 几几几对 对对  (Six ‘Why's’: Answers to Some Major Questions) (Beijing, China: Xuexi Chubanshe, 2009), pp. 73, 
56-57. 
103 Yu Keping, “30 Years of China’s Governance Reform (1978 to 2008),” in The Reform of Governance, ed. Yu 
Keping (Koninklijke Brill NV and Social Sciences Academic Press, 2010), pp. 4-14. 
104 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Premier Wen Jiabao Meets the Press,” transcript, 
March 15, 2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t914983.htm.  
105 For more information on China’s experiments with “intra-Party democracy,” see Cheng Li, “Intra-Party Democracy 
in China: Should We Take It Seriously?” China Leadership Monitor, no. 30 (November 19, 2009), 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/article/5413. 
106 The China Law Center at Yale Law School maintains a useful website with links to the full texts of China’s open 
government information regulations in both English and Chinese: http://www.law.yale.edu/intellectuallife/
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Chinese citizens to have a direct role in selecting their top leaders, rather than to pave the way for 
citizens to claim such a role. 
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